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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of two essays: one looks at the cross-country variations in 
volume-price variability relationship and cultural and other country factors, and the other looks 
at cause and effects of large one-day price changes in commodity futures. 
The first essay presented in Chapter 1 investigates the effect of cultural and other 
country factors on the dynamic relation between market-wide trading activity and price 
variability in 20 countries.  The results show that individualism and masculinity are positively 
related to volume-variability relation; other country factors including information asymmetry, 
financial development, short sale and age distribution are also closely related to the volume-
variability relation. Specifically, the return-variability relation is stronger in less financially-
developed countries with short-sale constraints and high information asymmetry. 
The second essay presented in Chapter 2 examines the causes and effects of large price 
changes in 26 commodity futures. The results indicate that announcements of macroeconomic 
news, the maturity effect, and the seasonal effect can explain the futures price movements of 
food (non-grains), grain, and livestock better than those of energy and metal. Without 
controlling for other factors, I find some support for the overreaction theory, especially 
following negative large price changes in closing. However, controlling for macro factors or 
market conditions, there is no support for overreactions. 
Key Words: Cultural factors, trading volume, absolute price, large price changes, 
overreaction, maturity effect 
iii 
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Chapter 1 
Cross-Country Variations in Volume-Price Variability Relationship and  
Cultural and Other Country Factors 
 
1. Introduction  
In recent years, a growing body of literature has shown cultural factors having effects on 
many financial decisions and strategies. Examples include momentum strategy and trading 
behavior (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2010), financial systems (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006), capital 
structure (Chui, Lloyd and Kwok, 2002; Li, Griffin, Yue and Zhao, 2011), protection of investor 
rights (Stulz and Williamson, 2003), mergers (Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi, 2011) and dividend 
policy (Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010; Shao, Kwok and Guedhami, 2010). Of particular interest here 
is the paper by Chui, Titman and Wei (2010), who find that the momentum effect in the stock 
market is stronger in countries with stronger degree of individualism. Their results imply that 
cultural factors affect trading behavior. It is hypothesized here that since cultural factors affect 
trading, they might also affect the relation between trading volume and price variability.  
In addition, extant papers on the relation between volume and returns or absolute 
returns (e.g., Clark, 1973; Rogalski, 1978; Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 2007) mainly focus 
on contemporaneous relationship or lagged relation in the short term (weeks 1 through 20) at 
stock market. The only long-term study is by Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) that find the 
positive volume-returns relation dissipates after eight months by using the US monthly data 
over 1962-2002. No research has attempted to compare short-term and long-term relationship 
between trading volume and price variability across countries.  
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In this paper, I examine the relation between trading volume and price variability 
patterns at the market level in 20 countries
1
 and whether cross-country variations in volume 
and price variability relation might be explained by cultural and other country factors. More 
specifically, in the first part, I examine the relationship between stock trading volume and 
variability in 20 countries. In the second part, I examine whether the volume-variability relation 
might vary with time horizons.
2
 In the third part, I examine whether cultural factors and other 
cross-country factors may affect the volume-variability relationship. 
Although there is a large body of literature on volume-variability relationship, cultural 
and other country factors have never been incorporated to account for such relationship. 
Hence, one contribution is to examine the effects of cultural and other country factors on the 
volume-variability relationship. Cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1997) include four 
indexes, namely, individualism index (IDV), masculinity index (MAS), uncertainty avoidance 
index (UAI), and power distance index (PDI). In particular, Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) argue 
that IDV is related to overconfidence and self-attribution bias. Moreover, people in 
individualistic culture are overoptimistic about their abilities, and they tend to overestimate the 
precision of their prediction. Hence, I expect individualism to be positively related to the 
relationship between absolute value of returns and volume. MAS refers to the distribution of 
roles between the genders, and it is suggested that in more masculine countries people are 
                                                          
1
 The countries are distributed over Oceania, South America, North America, Asia, and Europe. 
2
 Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) conclude that the lead-lag relation between returns and volume 
is stronger in earlier periods in US stock market. 
3 
 
somewhat assertive and competitive and are more likely to take risk. Therefore, I expect that 
the relationship between absolute value of returns and volume to be more positive in countries 
with high MAS. PDI is “the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and 
institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally”. (Hofstede, 1997, p.28) A 
high PDI indicates that the less powerful members of the society are more willing to accept 
inequality of power and wealth. UAI reflects a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The combination of two high scores on these indexes UAI and PDI reflects a society that is more 
rule-oriented, less readily accepts changes, and less likely to take greater risks. Hence, I expect 
that for countries with higher UAI and PDI, the relationship between absolute value of returns 
and volume tends to be weaker. To verify the robustness of my findings, I also use GLOBE’s 
cultural dimensions (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta (2004)) to further study on 
volume-variability relation.
3
 
Second, I also incorporate other country factors (e.g., the degree of financial market 
development) that might be important in explaining the volume-price variability relation. Third, 
to my knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to examine whether the volume-
variability relationship depends on time horizons across countries. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. 
Sections 3 describes the data and section 4 provides the methodologies. In section 5 I present 
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                          
3
 See Appendix A for more information about GLOBE’s cultural dimensions. 
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2.Literature Review 
2.1 Empirical Evidence on Returns-Volume Relation 
The empirical research on the stock price-volume relation in financial markets primarily 
focuses on two aspects: (1) the correlation between volume and price changes and (2) the 
correlation between volume and absolute value of price changes.  
 
2.1.1     Volume-Price Changes Relation  
Existing literatures show that there is on average a positive relation between returns 
and volume. For example, using monthly data from 10 stocks and 10 warrants, Rogalski (1978) 
finds a contemporaneous positive correlation between price changes and volume, but no 
lagged correlation. More recent empirical work has investigated the lagged relation between 
price changes and volume. For example, Chan and Tse (1993) show a positive correlation 
between price and volume through their residuals. Hiemstra and Jones (1994) find a significant 
positive correlation between returns and volume through the use of nonlinear Granger 
causality. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) find negative past returns are positively 
related to dollar volume in the US market from 1988 through 1998. Griffin, Nardari and Stulz 
(2007) investigate the dynamic relation between market-wide trading activity and returns in 46 
countries and report a strong positive relationship between turnover and past returns.  
However, some papers report mixed results for the relation between volume and price 
changes. An early empirical examination on volume-price changes was conducted by Granger 
and Morgenstern (1963). Using spectral analysis on weekly index data and daily transactions of 
individual stock data on New York Stock Exchange, they conclude that prices and volume are 
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virtually unrelated and that price changes follow a random-walk. Using daily, weekly, and 
monthly series of different indices in the Tokyo Stock Exchanges, Tse (1991) finds a significant 
positive relationship in some series and not in others; hence, he concludes that the relationship 
between price changes and volume in the market is weak. In addition, using daily data, Bhagat 
and Bhatia (1996) provide evidence that price changes lead volume, but no evidence that 
volume leads price changes.  
In brief, although there are some exceptions about the positive relationship between 
price changes and volume, overall there seems to be more support for positive relationship 
between price changes and volume. 
 
2.1.2   Volume-Absolute Price Changes Relation  
Using daily and hourly price changes for both market indices and individual stocks, 
Crouch (1970) finds a positive correlation between volume and absolute value of returns. Using 
the daily price changes for 136 futures contracts, Rutledge (1984) finds a significant correlation 
between volume and absolute value of price changes for 113 futures contracts. Using daily 
transaction data, Wood, Mcinish, and Ord (1985) report a positive correlation between volume 
and the magnitude of price changes. Smirlock and Starks (1988) document a strong positive 
lagged relation between volume and absolute value of price changes at stock transaction level. 
Wang (1994) concludes that trading volume is positively correlated with absolute price changes 
and the correlation increases with information asymmetry. Using monthly index data, 
Saatcioglu and Starks (1998) show that investors are more likely to trade when price changes 
are large in absolute value. 
6 
 
In addition, there is a vast number of empirical evidence on relationship between 
volume and price volatility, which also reflects absolute price changes. Using daily data from the 
cotton futures markets, Clark (1973) finds a positive relation between the variance of price 
changes and aggregated volume. Morgan (1976) finds that the variance of price changes is 
positively related to trading volume by using four-day interval and monthly data from a total of 
51 stocks. Cornell (1981) finds a positive relationship between changes in volume and changes 
in the variability of prices, each measured over two-month intervals, for each of 17 futures 
contracts. Using daily data from 479 common stocks, Harris (1983) finds a positive correlation 
between volume and the square of the price changes. Grammatikos and Saunders (1986) also 
find volume is positively correlated with price variability for foreign currency futures. 
Richardson, Sefeik and Thompson (1986) show that trading volume increases with variance of 
abnormal returns around announcements of dividend changes. Similar empirical evidence is 
document by Karpoff (1986, 1987), Gerety and Mulherin (1992), and Bessembinder, Chan, and 
Seguin (1996). Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992) investigate the price and volume co-
movement using daily data from 1928 to 1987 for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and find a 
positive relationship between conditional price volatility and stock volume. Chan and Fong 
(2000) find that trading volume for foreign stocks is strongly associated with NYSE opening price 
volatility.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Explanations  
Several theoretical explanations have been offered to explain empirical evidence on 
volume-price changes relation and volume-absolute price changes relation, respectively. For 
volume-absolute price changes, two explanations are offered. First, Copeland (1976, 1977), 
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Morse (1980), Jennings, Starks, and Fellingham (1981), and Jennings and Barry (1983) develop 
and extend “sequential arrival of information” models where new information is disseminated 
sequentially to traders in the market, and traders not yet informed cannot rely on information 
to trade. Hence, the sequential arrival of information generates co-movement between trading 
volume and price changes. Consequently, trading volume is strongly associated with absolute 
value of price changes and that volume should increase during those time periods when price 
changes are serially correlated. Second, based on “mixture-of-distributions” hypothesis that 
daily price changes are uncorrelated and symmetrically distributed, Clark (1973), Epps and Epps 
(1976), Tauchen and Pitts (1983) and Harris (1983), derive a model in which  volatility of price 
changes is conditioned on volume (Karpoff, 1987). For volume-price changes relation, one 
explanation is found in Epps (1976), who constructed a model that implies positive price 
changes induce higher volume than negative price changes. Based on the assumption of 
concept of “bear” and “bull” investors, he argues that “bulls” are more optimistic about the 
value of asset and they react only to good news, while “bears” only react to bad news. The 
demand curve only consists of the demand prices of “bulls”, while supply curve only consists of 
prices of “bears”. Therefore, the market demand curve is steeper than the supply curve. That is, 
positive price changes have a larger effect on volume than negative price changes. 
 
2.3 Possible Factors for Cross-Country Variations in Volume-Variability Relation 
Theoretical literature on the explanations of volume-variability relation suggests the 
following factors that might explain the volume-price variability relation across countries: 
information asymmetry, short sale, financial development, age distribution and cultural factors. 
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2.3.1 Information Asymmetry 
Wang (1994) argues that information asymmetry among investors induces trading and 
trading is accompanied by price changes since investors are risk averse. When traders are 
informed with information or news that would depreciate stock prices in the near future, they 
tend to sell their stock shares, there must be a drop in stock prices that induces uninformed 
investors to buy. As information asymmetry increases, the uninformed investors will require a 
higher discount in stock prices to cover the risk of trading without knowing information. 
Conversely, when traders are informed with news that would appreciate stock prices, they 
would like to buy stock, there must be an increase in stock prices to induce uninformed traders 
to sell. Therefore, trading volume is positively correlated with the magnitude of price changes 
and the correlation increases with information asymmetry. Llorente, Michaely, Saar and Wang 
(2002) also document that trading volume and returns autocorrelation patterns in relation to 
information asymmetry due to the existence of private information. Therefore, I expect the 
positive volume-variability relationship to be stronger in countries with higher degree of 
information asymmetry. 
 
2.3.2.   Short Sale  
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that when short sale is prohibited, adverse 
information is incorporated into prices at a slow speed. The model of Brennan and Cao (1997) 
suggests that volume-price relation should be weaker as information is incorporated into price 
at a quicker rate. Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2007) conclude a significantly positive relationship 
between returns and volume in 16 out of 21 countries that do not allow short sale but only in 8 
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out of 25 countries that allow short sale. Hence, I expect the volume-variability relation to be 
stronger where short sale is costly. 
2.3.3    Financial development  
In less financially development countries, there might be more trading noise, a cause of 
volatility. Therefore, I expect the volume-variability relation to be stronger in less financially 
development countries. 
 
 
2.3.4    Age Distribution 
Bakshi and Chen (1994) argue that an investor’s relative risk aversion increases with age. 
As people get older, they are more risk averse and less actively participating in trading activity, 
therefore, I expect the volume-variability relation to be weaker when the average age of 
population increases. 
 
2.3.5 Cultural Factors 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) find that people in individualistic cultures tend to be 
optimistic about their abilities, which is associated with overconfidence and self attribution. 
They provide evidence that individualism is positively associated with the trading volume. They 
also find positive relation between individualism and volatility. Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998), Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), and Glaser and Weber (2009) 
suggest that overconfidence generates excess trading volume and volatility. Therefore, if 
investors are overconfident, there might be a stronger positive correlation between volume 
and price variability.  
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3.  Data 
3.1 Price Variability and Volume   
To examine the relationship between volume and price variability through time and 
across countries, I use the daily and monthly data from January 2, 1993 through September 1, 
2011.
4
 From Yahoo Finance website and DataStream, I collect the daily and monthly market 
prices and trading volume of 20 countries in US currency. I calculate turnover by scaling the 
trading value by market capitalization, which can be retrieved from the World Bank database.
5
 
 
3.2 Cultural Factors and Other Factors      
I collect cultural dimensions including PDI, IDV, MAS and UAI for 20 countries from 
Hofstede (1997). I also incorporate other country variables that might be helpful in explaining 
the relation: (1) to measure the information asymmetry and information disclosure, I use the 
disclosure index of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). In addition, the number of 
analysts and the precision of analyst forecast are obtained from Chang, Khanna, and Palepu 
(2000); (2) the short sale dummy variable is obtained from Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007); (3) 
to measure financial development, I use log of GDP per capita and market capitalization to GDP 
to proxy financial development. These two variables come from World Bank Data; (4) to 
                                                          
4
 Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2007) focus on 10.5 years from January 2, 1993 through June 30, 2003 to 
examine volume-returns relation. 
5
 Lo and Wang (2000) argue in favor of using turnover over alternative measure of trading activity. 
Therefore, following Lo and Wang (2000), I scale the trading value by contemporaneous market value. 
Throughout the article, I use turnover but for convenience will often refer to it simply as volume. 
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measure age distribution, I use the weighted average age of population of persons 20 and older 
of each country
6
, which is obtained from U.S. Census Bureau.  
 
4.Methodology 
4.1Estimating Volume-Variability Relation 
Similar to the methodology of Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006), I estimate volume-
absolute returns relation through time by using vector autoregressive (VAR) model on a 
country-by-country basis.
7
 Here, absolute returns measure price variability. A large body of 
literature (e.g., Rogalski, 1978; Heimstra and Jones, 1994) suggests that there is a Granger 
Causality relation between price changes and volume; hence, VAR model can better capture 
volume-price variability relation.
8
 Moreover, based on the VAR model, impulse response 
estimation can be performed to describe how volume reacts over time to price variability. The 
bivariate VAR model contains two endogenous variables, turnover and price variability, and is 
specified as follows: 
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6
 Persons under 20 may not play a role in economic decision making. 
7
 Lucas (1976) points out it is naive to use a structural model to predict the effect of economic policy on 
the basis of historical data. This is the well-known Lucas Critique. Lucas (1976, p.41) writes, "Given that 
the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that 
optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision 
models." 
8
 In this paper, I only look at the response of turnover to absolute return. Although I use VAR model as 
shown Eq. (1), I only report the impulse response of volume to absolute returns. 
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where Vol is log of turnover and abs(Ret) is absolute value of price changes, which is defined as 
1
1)(Re
−
−−=
t
tt
t p
pp
tabs and p is stock price. The regression coefficients   estimate the 
relationship between turnover and price variability, where p is the number of lags.  
To estimate Eq. (1), first, I use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz' Bayesian 
Information Criterion (SIC/BIC/SBIC) and likelihood ratio test to identify the appropriate lags of 
variables. Then, I use augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to determine whether volume and 
price variability are stationary or not. If they are stationary, I estimate VAR model by using the 
ordinary least squares regression analysis. Since individual VAR coefficient estimates do not 
capture the full impact of an exogenous variable observation, I use the associated impulse 
response function to trace the full impact of a shock.  
 
4.2 Cultural Factors and Other Cross-Country Variations 
To examine how the volume-variability relation depends on the cultural and other 
factors, I form the following regression analysis based on Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010):  
 
ititiiiii
iiititiit
AgeUAIPDIMASIDVAnalysts
DisclosureErrorGDPCapShorteffect
εξωϕδγφ
πρµϑθα
+++++++
+++++= 1
                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                       (2) 
where iteffect  indicates the five-day response of volume to absolute value of returns in country 
i in year t. While explanatory variables iShort (short sale dummy), iError (forecast error), 
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iDisclosure (disclosure), iAnalysts (number of analysts), iIDV , iMAS , iPDI ,and iUAI are constant 
over time for each country i, the explanatory variables itCap (market capitalization/GDP), itGDP
(GDP per capita) and itAge  are updated annually for country i. To efficiently estimate the 
effects of cultural factors, I use random-effect procedure to estimate Eq. (2). I expect to see 
parameters θ  ,ϑ , µ ,π , φ  , ϕ , ω , and ξ to be significantly negative, which suggest those 
variables have a negative effect on the response of volume to absolute value of returns. I also 
expect to see parameters ρ , γ  , and δ to be significantly positive which imply that those 
factors are positively correlated with the impact of absolute value of returns on volume.  
 
5. Empirical Evidence 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for daily absolute returns, volatility, and turnover. 
Using World Bank classification, I separate my sample into high-income countries and 
developing countries according to national income (GNI) per capita. Panel A summarizes results 
for high-income countries, and Panel B summarizes results for developing countries.  
Panel A indicates that in high-income countries, volatility varies across countries. New 
Zealand has the lowest volatility, while France, Hong Kong, Netherland and UK have volatility 
roughly twice greater than Australia, Switzerland and US. Turnover in Netherland and US is over 
0.3 per cent per day, meaning that over 0.3 percent of the outstanding shares are traded in a 
given day. However, Australia, Belgium, France, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Switzerland all have turnover of less than 0.1 per cent per day. Developing markets are  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics (Daily Data) 
For each country, I report the mean (µ) for daily absolute returns, volatility, and turnover. Units are percent per 
day. Panel A summarizes result for high-income markets, whereas panel B summarizes results for developing 
countries.  
 
Country 
Abs(Return)  Volatility  Turnover  
µ(%) µ (%) µ(%) 
Panel A: High-income country    
Australia 0.0228 0.0074 0.0872 
Belgium 0.0212 0.0133 0.0869 
Canada 0.0187 0.0099 0.1311 
France 0.0126 0.0142 0.0695 
Hong Kong 0.0284 0.0154 0.0817 
Japan 0.0001 0.0126 0.0973 
Netherland 0.0149 0.0148 0.3120 
New Zealand  0.0139 0.0031 0.0758 
Singapore 0.0211 0.0106 0.0497 
Switzerland 0.0198 0.0087 0.0681 
UK 0.0263 0.0166 0.1517 
US 0.0308 0.0086 0.3270 
Mean, high-income 0.0192 0.0113 0.1281 
Panel B: Developing countries    
Brazil 0.0836 0.0241 0.0243 
China 0.0880 0.0200 0.5081 
India 0.0108 0.0209 0.1626 
Indonesia 0.0098 0.0121 0.0477 
South Korea 0.0715 0.0220 0.3317 
Malaysia 0.0404 0.0226 0.0523 
Mexico 0.0860 0.0104 0.0497 
Vietnam  0.0381 0.0344 0.1846 
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Table 1  
Continued 
   
Country 
Abs(Return)  Volatility  Turnover  
µ(%) µ (%) µ(%) 
Mean, developing countries 0.0535 0.0208 0.1701 
Mean, all 0.0330 0.0151 0.1450 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics (Monthly Data) 
For each country, I report the mean (µ) for monthly absolute returns, volatility, and turnover. Units are percent per 
month. Panel A summarizes results for high-income markets, whereas panel B summarizes results for developing 
countries. 
Country 
Abs(Return)  Volatility  Turnover  
µ(%)  (%) µ(%) 
Panel A: High-income country    
Australia 3.0947 1.3273 2.6158 
Belgium 2.7141 2.4543 2.7998 
Canada 2.4541 1.8647 3.9567 
France 1.8769 3.4242 2.0001 
Hong Kong 3.9969 3.2417 2.2192 
Japan 0.0156 3.0471 3.2224 
Netherland 2.0479 3.2575 8.4322 
New Zealand  1.9471 1.0123 2.2786 
Singapore 3.0042 2.1119 1.3454 
Switzerland 2.9913 2.0004 2.0897 
UK 4.2214 3.5267 5.3374 
US 4.5796 1.5217 9.8762 
Mean, high-income 2.7453 2.3992 3.8478 
Panel B: Developing countries    
Brazil 7.4312 4.2376 0.8886 
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Table 2  
Continued 
   
Country 
Abs(Return)  Volatility  Turnover  
µ(%)  (%) µ(%) 
China 7.3467 4.0089 9.9915 
India 1.5346 3.7865 5.3487 
Indonesia 0.8976 2.1768 1.4235 
South Korea 6.4319 4.6795 9.9809 
Malaysia 5.3221 5.9801 1.5646 
Mexico 8.4562 1.8709 1.3428 
Vietnam  4.5853 5.7864 5.4386 
Mean, developing countries 5.2507 4.0656 4.5284 
Mean, all 3.7475 3.0659 4.1201 
 
examined in Panel B, turnover also varies across markets. China and South Korea have highest 
turnover, over 0.3 per cent per day, whereas turnover in Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Mexico is below 0.1 per cent per day. The average volatility of developing markets is 0.0208%  
per day, higher than that of high-income countries (0.0113%) per day. The average absolute 
return of developing countries is 0.0535% per day, higher than that of high-income countries 
(0.0192%) per day. 
To compare the volume-variability relation across countries over time, I also present the 
summary statistics in Table 2 for monthly variability, turnover, and volatility for 20 countries, 
including both developing countries and high-income countries. Similar patterns in absolute 
returns, volatility and turnover are found in Table 2. The average absolute return of developing 
countries is 5.2507% per month, higher than that of high-income countries (2.7453%) per 
17 
 
month. In high-income countries, Netherland and the US have the highest turnover, over 8% 
per month, which is followed by UK (5.3374%) per month. Singapore, France, and Switzerland 
rank the bottom three in turnover, less than 2.1% per month. In developing countries, turnover 
in China and South Korea is about 10% per month, while Brazil has the smallest turnover 
(0.8886%) per month.  
 
5.2 Estimating the Absolute Return-Volume Relation 
5.2.1 Short-Term relation  
My main tool for estimating absolute the return-volume relation is VAR model on a 
country-by-country basis. Because individual VAR coefficient estimates do not capture the full 
impact of an exogenous observation, I use associated impulse response function to trace the 
full impact of a shock until the relation reaches equilibrium. The responses are expressed in 
standard deviation units. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for each country series. In addition, by using AIC, BIC, and LR test, the appropriate lag 
length is chosen for the VARs estimation for each country. 
  Figure 1 presents the bivariate cumulative impulse response functions measuring the 
effect of a one standard deviation shock to daily absolute returns on volume. The summary 
statistics of Figure 1 are found in Table 3.  
 Figure 1 suggests that turnover is related to absolute returns in all countries. In Table 3, 
the cumulative impulse response of turnover to absolute returns generally shows an increasing 
trend over time. After ten days, an absolute return shock is accompanied by an increase in 
turnover in 20 countries. On average, a 0.0097 standard deviation increase in turnover follows 
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one standard deviation shock of absolute return after one day, while 0.0121 standard deviation 
increase in turnover after five days, and 0.0154 standard deviation increase in turnover after 
ten days. However, there are large differences in the relation of absolute return and volume 
between high-income countries and developing markets. After one day, a one standard 
deviation to absolute returns is followed by 0.0067 standard deviation increase in turnover in 
high-income countries, while at the same frequency in developing countries, a one standard 
deviation in absolute return is followed by 0.0143 standard deviation increase in turnover. After 
five days, a one standard deviation shock to absolute returns is followed by 0.0081 standard  
 
 
Figure 1  
Cumulative Impulse Response Functions From Bivariate Vector Autoregressions 
Daily returns and turnover are used to estimate country-by-country bivariate VARs. The figure reports the 
generalized impulse response function of turnover to a one standard deviation shock in absolute return at lags one, 
five, and ten days in each country. All responses are standardized by the standard error. Turnover is scaled by 
market capitalization. High-income countries are in alphabetical order on the left side of the graph and developing 
countries are on the right. 
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Table 3  
Summary Statistics of Impulse Response Functions—Daily Data 
 
IRF 
High Income Developing Countries All Countries 
µ Med σ - + µ Med σ - + µ Med σ - + 
Lag 1 0.0067 0.0066 0.0017 0 20 0.0143 0.0034 0.0051 0 20 0.0097 0.0021 0.0187 0 20 
Lag 5 0.0081 0.0090 0.0023 0 20 0.0181 0.0063 0.0061 0 20 0.0121 0.0027 0.0063 0 20 
Lag 10 0.0114 0.0102 0.0069 0 20 0.0215 0.0082 0.0090 0 20 0.0154 0.0040 0.0109 0 20 
For each country-level VAR, I compute the generalized impulse response function of turnover to a one standard deviation shock to 
absolute return at various lags. The table reports the mean (µ), median (Med), and standard deviation (σ) of the responses for high-
income, developing, and all countries. I also report the number of positive (+), and negative (-) responses. 
 
 
 
deviation increase in turnover in high-income countries, while in developing countries, the response is 0.0181 standard deviation. 
After ten days, a one standard deviation shock to absolute returns is followed by 0.0114 standard deviation increase in turnover in 
high-income countries, while in developing countries, a one standard deviation in absolute return is followed by 0.0215 standard 
deviation increase in turnover. 
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The magnitude of absolute return-volume relation varies across countries within high-
income country and developing country. In Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Netherland, and New 
Zealand, a one standard deviation shock to absolute return is followed by a larger increase in 
turnover (more than 1% standard deviation) after five days, while for Belgium, a one standard 
deviation shock to absolute return is followed by a smallest increase in turnover(0.08% 
standard deviation). In developing markets, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
and Vienna show a greater response in turnover to one standard deviation shock to absolute 
returns (larger than 1% standard deviation), while in Brazil and China, a one standard deviation 
shock in absolute return is followed by around 0.8% (smaller than 1%) standard deviation 
increase in turnover after five days.  
5.2.2 Long-Term Relation 
 To examine the volume-variability relation over longer periods, I also investigate the 
bivariate model on a monthly basis across countries. Figure 2 presents the bivariate cumulative 
impulse response functions measuring the effect of a one standard deviation shock to monthly 
variability on volume. The summary statistics of Figure 2 are found in Table 4.  
 Table 4 indicates similar short-term trends as those in Table 3, but there are some 
reversals of volume-variability relation in 5-6 countries after five and ten months. More 
specifically, after ten months, an absolute return shock is accompanied by an increase in 
turnover in 14 countries, but accompanied by a decrease in 6 countries. An average 1.8053 
standard deviation increase in turnover follows one standard deviation shock of absolute return   
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after one month, while 1.5728 standard deviation increase in turnover after five months, and 
1.7495 standard deviation increase in turnover after ten months. 
 However, there are large differences in the relation of absolute return and volume 
between high-income countries and developing markets. After one month, a one standard 
deviation to absolute returns is followed by 0.6868 standard deviation increase in turnover in 
high-income countries, while at the same frequency in developing countries, a one standard 
deviation in absolute return is followed by 3.4829 standard deviation increase in turnover. 
Similar patterns can be found for after five months (0.7881 standard deviation increase in 
turnover in high-income countries, while 2.3490 standard deviation increase in developing 
countries) and after ten months (0.8937 standard deviation increase in turnover in high-income 
countries, while 2.6242 standard deviation increase in developing countries). Comparing the 
reversal of the volume-variability relation between high-income countries and developing 
countries, in general reversal is more likely in developing countries.  
The magnitude of absolute return-volume relation varies across countries within high-
income country and developing country. After five months, in high-income countries, only 
Singapore shows a reversal of volume-variability relation, while in developing countries, Brazil, 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Vienna present a picture of reversal of volume-variability relation. After 
ten months, only Singapore shows a reversal of volume-variability relation, while in developing 
countries, five countries including Brazil, China, Malaysia, Mexico, and Vienna show a reversal 
of their volume-variability relation.  
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Figure 2  
Cumulative Impulse Response Functions From Bivariate Vector Autoregressions 
Monthly returns and turnover are used to estimate country-by-country bivariate VARs. The figure reports the 
generalized impulse response function of turnover to a one standard deviation shock in absolute return at lags one, 
five, and ten months in each country. All responses are standardized by the standard error. Turnover is scaled by 
market capitalization. High-income countries are in alphabetical order on the left side of the graph and developing 
countries are on the right. 
 
 
Therefore, comparing the short-term and long-term volume-variability relation, there is 
no reversal of volume-variability relation after five or ten days in all countries, when focusing 
on monthly data; both high-income countries and developing countries show a reversal of 
volume-variability relation after five or ten months.  
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Table 4  
Summary Statistics of Impulse Response Functions—Monthly Data 
 
IRF 
High Income Developing Countries All Countries 
µ Med σ - + µ Med σ - + µ Med σ - + 
Lag 1 0.6868 0.6632 0.1776 0 12 3.4829 3.1220 0.8524 0 8 1.8053 1.0186 1.3501 0 20 
Lag 5 0.7881 0.8992 0.2171 1 11 2.3490 1.2947 1.1826 4 4 1.5728 0.9986 2.6615 5 15 
Lag 10 0.8937 0.8217 0.3946 1 11 2.6242 1.3547  1.1907 5 3 1.7495 1.0157 2.4021 6 14 
For each country-level VAR, I compute the generalized impulse response function of turnover to a one standard deviation shock to 
absolute return at various lags. The table reports the mean (µ), median (Med), and standard deviation (σ) of the responses for high-
income, developing, and all countries. I also report the number of positive (+), and negative (-) responses. 
 
 
5.3Estimating Cultural factors and Other Cross-Country Variations 
Table 5 reports the regression results, where the dependent variable is the five-day response of turnover to absolute return 
for each country in each year (total number of observations = 20 countries*number of years, which varies across countries). A 
country random effect is incorporated in the regression analysis, since there might be other country factors not captured by our 
model. In regression (1), the independent variables include short sale dummy variable, financial development, information 
asymmetry, Hofstede’s cultural factors, and age distribution. The absolute return-volume relation is much stronger in countries with 
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short-sale restrictions, meaning that volume-price variability relation tend to be stronger when 
short sale is costly and such relation increases with the information asymmetry. Financial 
development is proxied by market capitalization to GDP and GDP per capita, which are 
significantly negatively related to the volume-variability relation. This result suggests that in less 
financially-developed countries, the volume-variability relation tends to be stronger. A potential 
explanation is that trading noise might be more in less developed countries and some studies 
suggest trading noise is a cause of volatility. In this study, the number of analysts, forecast error, 
and disclosure represent proxies for information environment. As I argue earlier, in more 
opaque countries, the volume-variability relation tends to be stronger. The coefficient of 
number of analyst is negative and significant, while the coefficient of forecast error is positive 
and significant. Disclosure has an insignificant but negative effect on the volume-variability 
relation. Therefore, the results again suggest that the relation between absolute value of return 
and volume increases with information asymmetry. Regarding cultural factors, IDV and MSI are 
positively related to the volume-variability relation, whereas PDI and UAI are significantly 
negative related to the volume-variability relation. Therefore, the results indicate that for 
countries with high level of individualism and are more masculine, individuals are more likely to 
trade following large shocks. It supports the hypothesis that people in individualistic culture are 
overoptimistic about their abilities, and they tend to overestimate the precision of their 
prediction. Hence, individualism tends to be positively related to the relationship between 
absolute value of returns and volume. Similarly, the results are supportive of the expectation 
that people in more masculine countries are more assertive and competitive, and are more 
likely to take risk. Hence, masculine index tends to be positively related to the volume-
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variability relation. The signs of the other two cultural dimensions, PDI and UAI, are also 
consistent with expectations. As predicted, age distribution, a measure of the weighted average 
age of each country, is negatively related to volume-variability relation. As people get older, 
they are more risk averse and less actively participating in trading activity, therefore, the 
volume-variability relation is weaker as the average age of population increases. As additional 
robust checks, I estimate two additional regression models as described below. Regression (2) 
of Table 5 excludes IDV; the results are consistent with those of the full model except that PDI is 
no longer significant. Regression (3) of Table 5 excludes PDI, and the results indicate that all 
variables are significant. Therefore, the results regarding PDI are not robust.  
To verify the robustness of my findings regarding cultural factors (Hofstede (1997)), I 
also use GLOBE’s (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) cultural 
dimensions (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta (2004)) to further study on the 
volume-variability relation. The GLOBE’s cultural factors are classified into nine dimensions: 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), Institution Collectivism (IC), Power Distance (PD), and 
Assertiveness, Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, In-Group Collectivism, and Gender 
Egalitarianism. Among these dimensions, the institutional collectivism is intended to reflect the 
opposite of Hofstede’s individualism (House, Robert, Javidan, Hanges, and Dormfman, 2002). 
That is, GLOBE’s institutional collectivism reflects the degree of collectivism in each country, 
and the higher the score in this index, the lower degree of individualism is implied. Consistent 
with expectation from Hofstede’s four cultural factors on volume-variability relation, I 
hypothesize that for countries that are more rule-oriented, more cohesive, and more 
acceptable authority, there is a weaker volume-variability relation; that is, the volume-
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variability relation should decrease with IC, PD, and UA. To be more specific, a negative effect 
of PD and UA on the volume-variability relation is expected. If traders are more assertive, and 
more likely to take risk, the return-variability relation should be stronger, suggesting that a high 
level of assertiveness induce a strong return-variability relation. Regression (1) of Table 6 
presents the results using GLOBE’s cultural factors, as well as short sales dummy, information 
asymmetry, financial development and age distribution on return-variability relation. The 
results are generally similar to those reported in regression (1) of Table (5). The results show 
that IC has a significant negative effect on return-variability relation, meaning that in a country 
where individuals are more likely to express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness, there is a weaker 
return-variability relation. Besides that, Assertiveness has a positive but insignificant effect on 
return-variability relation. Power distance and uncertainty avoidance are significantly 
negatively related to the volume-variability relation. As additional checks,  in regressions (2), I 
exclude IC, and in regression (3), I exclude PD and UA. The results show that IC is still significant, 
but PD and UA are no longer significant.   
In general, my results provide evidence that in countries with high level of individualism 
and masculinity, people tend to be more overoptimistic, thereby inducing a stronger return-
variability relation. In addition, I find that return-variability relation is stronger in less 
financially-developed countries with short-sale constraints and high information asymmetry.  
 
6. Conclusion  
This study examines the relation between volume and price variability in 20 countries 
for sample period of January 2, 1993 through September 1, 2011. Turnover is strongly and
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Table 5 
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis - based on Hofstede’s Cultural Factors 
The dependent variable is the five-day response of turnover to absolute return shock in each country each year 
obtained from a generalized impulse response function in a vector autoregression with absolute return, and 
turnover. Log (GDP) per capita is the natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic product. Market cap/GDP is 
the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product. The number of analysts and the precision of 
analyst forecast are from Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000). Disclosure is a measure of transparency, which is 
from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). Short sales dummy variable that equals 1 if short sale are 
allowed, which is from Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2006). IDV, MAS PDI, and UAI are four culture factors developed 
by Hofstede (1997). Age is measured as weighted average age of population of persons 20 and older of each 
country, which is obtained from U.S. Census Bureau. This table reports the random-effect estimates as well as the 
adjusted heteroskedasticity (White) p value. The asterisk *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels.   
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Short Sale -0.0061*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0041** 
(0.0289) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0034) 
Market cap/GDP -0.0002* 
(0.0879) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0854) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0912) 
Log GDP per capita -0.0034* 
(0.0913) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0967) 
-0.0020* 
(0.0932) 
Forecast Error 0.0260*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0125*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0134*** 
(0.0056) 
Number of Analysts -0.0011*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Disclosure -0.0012 
(0.2893) 
-0.0004 
(0.3334) 
-0.0009 
(0.2989) 
IDV 0.0040*** 
(0.0016) 
 0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
MAS 0.0012*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0098) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0034) 
PDI -0.0001* 
(0.0658) 
-0.0003 
(0.1232) 
 
UAI -0.0019** 
(0.0356) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0435) 
-0.0020** 
(0.0324) 
Age -0.0039** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0041** 
(0.0312) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0302) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.45 0.32 0.41 
Number of observations 345 345 345 
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Table6 
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis -Based on CLOBE’s Cultural Factors 
The dependent variable is the five-day response of turnover to absolute return shock in each country each year 
obtained from a generalized impulse response function in a vector autoregression with absolute return, and 
turnover. Log (GDP) per capita is the natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic product. Market cap/GDP is 
the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product. The number of analysts and the precision of 
analyst forecast are from Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000). Disclosure is a measure of transparency, which is 
from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). Short sales dummy variable that equals 1 if short sale are 
allowed, which is from Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2006). Assertiveness, IC, PD and UA are four culture factors 
developed by House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta (2004). IC is intended to reflect Hofstede’s individualism 
index. PD is the extent to which a community accepts and endorses authority, power differences and status 
privileges. UA is the extent to which a society, organization, or group relies on social norms, rules, and procedures 
to alleviate the unpredictability of future events. Age is measured as weighted average age of population of 
persons 20 and older of each country, which is obtained from U.S. Census Bureau. This table reports the random-
effect estimates as well as the adjusted heteroskedasticity (White) p value. The asterisk *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels.   
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Short Sale -0.0074*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0322) 
-0.0020** 
(0.0213) 
Market cap/GDP -0.0013* 
(0.0978) 
-0.0009* 
(0.0923) 
-0.0011* 
(0.0897) 
Log GDP per capita -0.0021* 
(0.0923) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0832) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0989) 
Forecast Error 0.0275*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0103*** 
(0.0010) 
Number of Analysts -0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0009) 
Disclosure -0.0009 
(0.3344) 
-0.0006 
(0.4362) 
-0.0008 
(0.3254) 
IC -0.0126*** 
(0.0075) 
 -0.0082** 
(0.0287) 
PD -0.0105* 
(0.0946) 
-0.0212 
(0.2019) 
 
UA -0.0023* 
(0.0813) 
-0.0012 
(0.1923) 
 
Assertiveness 0.0027 
(0.9616) 
0.0021 
(0.9489) 
0.0022 
(0.9879) 
Age -0.0004*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0002** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0092) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.40 0.24 0.37 
Number of observations 345 345 345 
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positively related to absolute returns in the majority of countries here. However, such relation 
is much stronger in developing countries than that in high-income countries. On average, a one 
standard deviation shock to absolute returns in developing countries is followed by 0.0143 
standard deviation increase in turnover after one day, and 0.0181 standard deviation increase 
in turnover after five days, and 0.0215 standard deviation increase in turnover after ten days. 
The response in high-income countries is 0.0067 standard deviation in turnover after one day, 
and 0.0081 standard deviation after five days, and 0.0114 standard deviation after ten days. 
Although the results show a consistent pattern that turnover follows absolute return in many 
markets, the relation diminishes over time in both high-income countries and developing 
countries. Using monthly data, five countries show reversal of volume-variability relation after 
five months, while six countries show reversal of the volume-variability relation after ten 
months.  
With regard to the factors that affect the volume-variability relation, my findings 
support the hypothesis that for less financially-developed countries with high degree of 
information asymmetry, and short sale restriction, there is a stronger volume-variability 
relation. There is also evident that cultural factors indeed have effect on the volume-variability 
relation. For countries with higher value of individualism and masculine, there is a stronger 
volume-variability relation. With regard to cultural dimensions of power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance, the results are also consistent with my expectations though not quite 
robust. To verify the robustness of effect of cultural factors on the volume-variability relation, I 
also use GLOBE’s cultural factors to measure the effect. In particular, in GLOBE, institutional 
collectivism reflects Hofstede’s individualism index. Similarly results are obtained that there is a 
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weaker volume-variability relation for countries with high level of institutional collectivism. The 
evidence is inconclusive regarding other GLOBE factors, including power distance, and 
uncertainty avoidance.   
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Appendix A 
GLOBE is an acronym for “Global Leadership and Organization Behavior Effectiveness,” a 62 
nation, 11-year study involving 170 researchers worldwide. It compares countries on nine 
critical cultural dimensions (see below) and discusses the implications of the cultural similarities 
and differences for global managers. 
Cultural Dimensions Definitions 
Performance 
Orientation 
The extent to which a community encourages innovation, high 
standards, excellence, and performance improvement 
Uncertainty Avoidance The extent to which a society, organization, or group relies on 
social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate the 
unpredictability of future events 
In-Group Collectivism The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and 
cohesiveness in their organizations or families 
Power Distance The extent to which a community accepts and endorses 
authority, power differences and status privileges 
Gender Egalitarianism The degree to which a collective minimized gender inequality 
Humane Orientation The degree to which organization or society encourages and 
rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, 
caring and kind to others  
Institutional 
Collectivism 
The degree to which organizational and societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of 
resources and collective action 
Future Orientation The degree to which a collective encourages and rewards 
future-oriented behaviors such as planning and delaying 
gratification 
Assertiveness The degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, 
and aggressive in their relationship with others 
 
Source: Regional definition from http://www.fuquaccl.wordpress.com/tag/institutional-
collectivism  
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Chapter 2 
Causes and Effects of Large One-Day Price Changes:  
The Case of Commodity Futures 
1.Introduction  
Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994) find that a large price change is a good proxy for 
information signal. Motivated by this finding and the overreaction hypothesis (De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1985) that suggests extreme movements in price changes will be followed by 
subsequent price movements in the opposite direction, in this paper, I investigate causes and 
effects of large one-day price changes in commodity futures in the U.S. market. More 
specifically, the first part of study attempts to infer the causes of large price changes by 
identifying the patterns of occurrence (opening or closing, near maturity or distant maturity 
contracts, and seasonal effects). These patterns might offer clues to the potential causes. The 
second part of the study analyzes the effects of these large price changes and analyzes whether 
the effects vary with systematic risks. 
Previous studies on price behavior following large price changes (e.g., Atkins and Dyl, 
1990; Bremer and Sweeney, 1991; Grant, Wolf and Yu, 2005) focus on either the stock markets 
or stock index futures markets. In this paper, I examine the price behavior following large one-
day price changes in 26 U.S. commodity futures markets. The study represents the first attempt 
to examine price patterns following large price changes in the commodity markets. There are 
several reasons to study large price changes in commodity futures. First, large changes in 
commodity prices are more likely caused by macroeconomic news and not by firm-specific 
news. Moreover, news tend to be announced near market opening, and therefore I expect 
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more large price changes to occur in the opening. Opposite results would suggest that noise 
trading is also an important driver of large price changes. Moreover, Sameulson (1965) 
proposes a “maturity effect” that large price changes tend to occur near maturity of futures; if 
so, large price changes are not entirely driven by information.
9
 By examining futures contracts 
of various maturities, I can assess the likelihood of these large changes caused by information. 
Second, players in the futures market might be on average better trained and better informed 
than stock market players as they are more likely to be professional and institutional investors. 
Thus, it would be interesting if overreaction or underreaction, even if only temporary, can be 
found among this group. On the other hand, commodity futures are harder to arbitrage and are 
more affected by seasonality, which implies that mispricing, if any, might be more persistent 
than financial futures. Therefore, whether commodity futures are characterized by a higher or 
lower degree of overreaction than index futures is an issue worth investigating. Third, I also 
employ a model that incorporates the effects of business cycle. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2 comprises a 
literature review on both causes and effects of large price changes. Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4 discusses the methodology. Section 5 presents empirical evidence. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 It is worth noting that clustering of information flows near delivery dates is not a necessary condition 
for the success of the Samuelson’s hypothesis; see Bessembinder, Coughenour, Seguin and 
Smeller(1996). 
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2.Literature Review 
2.1Causes of Large Price Changes 
2.1.1    Information and Noise 
Macroeconomic issues tend to be announced near the market opening; thus, big 
changes in opening price can be explained by announcements of macroeconomic news. 
Examples of these announcements include economic growth, inflation, changes in employment 
and unemployment, trade performance with other countries, and government economic 
policies and decisions. Schwert (1981), Pearce and Roley (1985), and Hardouvelis (1987) find 
monetary policy surprises (inflation, money supply and interest rate) have a strong effect on 
stock prices. Using the hourly data around the announcement time, Jain (1988) shows both 
monetary and inflation surprises significantly affect stock price. McQueen and Roley (1993) find 
news are responsible for stock prices changes on a daily-basis. Ederington and Lee (1993) 
examine the impact of macroeconomic news on interest rate and foreign futures markets and 
find a strong relationship between announcement and most of the observed time-of-day and 
day-of-the-week volatility patterns. For the bond market, the empirical evidence is generally 
strong. Grossman (1981), Urich and Wachtel (1981), Cornell (1982, 1983), Roley (1983) and 
Hardouvelis (1988) find significant impacts of money supply announcements during the 1970s 
and early 1980s period. Further, Fleming and Remolona (1997) show that, for the five-year 
Treasury note, prices change the sharpest from 8/23/1993 through 8/19/1994 in response to 
announcement, and most changes are within 15 minutes of announcement release. Balduzzi, 
Elton and Green (2001) suggest that public news are responsible for a substantial fraction of  
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price volatility after the announcement, and the adjustment to news generally happens within 
one minute in the aftermath of announcement. 
 
 French and Roll (1986, p.5) suggest that noise trading is also important; they state that, 
“asset prices are much more volatile during exchange trading hours than during non-trading 
hours.” They provide two explanations for this phenomenon: (1) information arrives more 
frequently during the business day; (2) the process of trading itself introduces noise into price. 
Therefore, large price changes at the market closing might be mostly due to trading noise. Black 
(1986) states that people who trade on noise think noise is information and are willing to trade 
on noise even though they would be better off not trading. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (1990) state that the presence of noise traders in financial markets can cause prices 
and risk levels to diverge from expected levels even if all other traders are rational. That is, from 
the theoretical point of view, trading by not fully rational noise traders can drive prices away 
from fundamental values.  
 
2.1.2 Maturity Effect  
Samuelson (1965) was the first to suggest the maturity effect, stating that futures price 
volatility increases as the futures contract approaches the maturity. The intuition under this 
hypothesis is that as futures contract approaches maturity, its price must converge to the spot 
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price; thus, it tends to fluctuate more significantly. Therefore, the price volatility should 
increase as the time to maturity shortens.
10
 
Earlier studies focus on the rate of information flow to explain the maturity effect (e.g., 
Anderson and Danthine, 1983; Kolb, 1991). A recent extension of Samueslon’s hypothesis is 
found in Bessembinder, Coughenour, Seguin and Smeller (1996). They argue that neither the 
clustering of information flows near delivery dates nor the assumption that each futures price is 
an unbiased forecast of the delivery date spot price are necessary conditions for the success of 
this hypothesis.
11
 However, by employing no-arbitrage “cost-of-carry” model, they argue that 
the Samuelson hypothesis will be supported in those markets that exhibit negative correlation 
between spot price changes and changes in the slope of futures term structure. They find 
strong empirical evidence for the maturity effect in agricultural and oil markets, but weaker 
evidence in the metal market and no evidence in financial futures. 
Previous empirical studies find some support for Samuelson’s hypothesis in commodity 
markets. Rutledge (1976) finds support in both silver and cocoa contracts. Milonas (1986) finds 
evidence for Samuelson’s hypothesis in 10 of 11 agricultural and metal futures. Galloway and 
Kolb (1996) also support the hypothesis by studying agricultural futures. In international 
markets, Allen and Cruickshank (2000) find strong support for the maturity effect in commodity 
                                                          
10
 Samuelson’s hypothesis is based on two assumptions that (1) each futures price equals the trading 
date expectation of the delivery date spot price, and (2) that the spot price itself follows a first order 
autoregressive process, with an AR(1) coefficient equal to 0.5. 
11
 Bessembinder, Coughenour, Seguin and Smeller (1996, p. 3), writes, “In the case of agricultural futures 
in particular, contracts mature not only near harvest dates, but throughout the year. …… Therefore, 
explanations that invoke systematic variation in rates of information flow are unlikely to provide 
accurate cross-sectional predictions regarding the validity of the Samuelson hypothesis.” 
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futures in the Sydney Futures Exchange, London International Financial Futures Exchange 
(LIFFE), and Singapore Derivatives Exchange. 
 
2.1.3 Seasonal Effects 
Most commodities are subject to the laws of demand and supply, but demand/supply 
imbalance might be more severe in certain times. For example, in agricultural markets (e.g., 
soybean, wheat, coffee, cocoa), prices are driven by seasonal supply (e.g., harvest, planting, 
weather conditions and transportation systems). In energy markets (e.g., heating oil, gasoline), 
prices are driven by seasonal demand (e.g., cold weather). Livestock (e.g., hog and cattle) also 
tend to be affected by seasonal effect (e.g., production and marketing). Milonas (1991) finds 
that seasonality effect is a major factor in commodity pricing process. He argues that for 
agricultural commodities, information about the factors (e.g., humidity and temperature) that 
affect the crop quality is continuously disseminated in the markets. Consequently, the 
volatilities tend to be greatest in months where the changing weather conditions lead to 
significant price adjustments. There is no reason to restrict seasonal effects to certain months. 
Similar month effects in agricultural commodities are documented by Roll (1984), Anderson 
(1985), and Fama and French (1987). 
 
2.2 Effects of Large Price Change 
According to Bremer, Hiraki and Sweeney (1997), research on overreaction is classified 
into three groups based on time horizons. The first group covers research on overreaction in 
the longer term, as long as 3-5 years. Examples include De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Chan 
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(1988), Ball and Kothari (1989), and Chan and Chen (1991). They generally find a tendency for 
price reversal. The second group includes studies on reversals in weeks or months. Jegadeesh 
(1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) find reversals in intermediate return data. The third group 
includes short-term price rebounds, which occurs in a few days after price shocks. For example, 
Atkins and Dyl (1990) find evidence of strong price reversals on common stocks after a large 
price change without considering transaction costs. Bremer and Sweeney (1991) report that 
stock prices reverse significantly following one-day price decline of 10% or more for Fortune 
500 stocks and price reversal is not related to the calendar effects. Park (1995) finds that price 
reversals persist for short-run period except on day+1 by using the average of the bid and ask 
prices. Further, transaction costs cannot explain the abnormal returns. Bremer, Hiraki and 
Sweeney (1997) report significant positive returns of firms in the Nikkei 300 following large 
price decreases, but little evidence of significant patterns following large price increases.  
Fung, Mok, and Lam (2000) add another study on overreaction that occurs on the same 
day as that a big price change occurs. They find large intraday price reversals after price 
changes in the S&P 500 Futures market and the Hang Seng Index Futures market. Similarly, 
Grant, Wolf and Yu (2005) find significant intraday price reversals in the US stock index futures 
market after large price changes at the market opening. Further, the strength of the intraday 
overreaction seems more pronounced following large positive price changes than negative 
price shocks at the market opening.  
Although an extensive literature supports reversals following large price changes, there 
are some exceptions. Using daily market indexes from 39 stock exchanges over the period 1989 
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to 1998, Lasfer, Melnik and Thomas (2003) find positive (negative) abnormal price returns in 
the short-term window (up to 10 days) following positive (negative) price shocks, which is not 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, but supports the momentum theory in stock 
indexes. Similar results are documented in Mazouz, Alrabadi and Yin (2011), who analyzes a 
yearly updated constituents list of Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange (FTSE) all 
share indexes and find that positive (negative) shocks tend to be followed by positive (negative) 
abnormal returns.   
In brief, studies of price behavior following large price changes tend to support two 
contrasting hypotheses of overreaction and underreaction. Although there seems to be no 
consensus in the literature on which one prevails, overall there seems to be more support for 
overreaction. 
 
3.Data 
I use a wide range of commodity futures, including energy, food (non-grains), grains, 
metals/fiber, and livestock. To be more specific, 26 commodity futures are included,  namely,  
Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Natural Gasoline, Cocoa, Orange Juice Frozen, Coffee, Sugar, Soybean Oil, 
Corn, Kansas City Wheat, Minnesota Wheat, Oats, Soybeans, Soybean Meal, Wheat, Cotton, 
Gold, Copper, Lumber, Palladium, Platinum, Silver, Feeder Cattle, Live Cattle, Live Hogs, and 
Pork Bellies. Except for Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Minnesota Wheat, and Natural Gas, other 
commodity futures span over 30-year period from 01/03/1978 to 06/02/2008. Crude oil spans 
from 03/30/1983 to 06/02/2008, Heating Oil covers a period from 03/06/1979 through 
06/02/2008, and Minnesota Wheat spans from 11/18/1980 to 06/02/2008, while Natural Gas  
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Table 1 Data Summary 
 
Futures price series Start date Close date Contract 
Months 
  Futures 
Exchange 
     
Crude Oil 03/30/1983 06/02/2008 Every Month   NYMEX○1       
Heating Oil 03/06/1979 06/02/2008 Every Month   NYMEX      
Natural Gasoline 04/03/1990 06/02/2008 Every Month   NYMEX      
Gold 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 Every Month   CME○2       
Copper 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 Every Month   CME      
Silver 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 Every Month   CME      
Cocoa 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,9,12   CSCE○3       
Corn 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,9,12   CBOT○4       
Coffee 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,9,12   CSCE
 
     
Kansas City Wheat 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,9,12   KCBT○5       
Minnesota Wheat 11/18/1980 06/02/2008 3,5,7,9,12   MGEX○6       
Oats 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,9,12   CBOT
 
     
Wheat 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,9,12   CBOT      
Soybean Oil 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12   CBOT      
Soybean Meal 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12   CBOT      
Soybeans 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 1,3,5,7,8,9,11   CBOT      
Orange Juice Frozen 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 1,3,5,7,9,11   ICE○7       
Lumber 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 1,3,5,7,9,11   CME      
Cotton 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,10,12   CSCE      
Sugar 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,5,7,10   CSCE      
Palladium 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 3,6,9,12   CME      
Platinum 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 1,4,7,10   CME      
Feeder Cattle 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 1,3,4,5,8,9,10,11   CME      
Live Cattle 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 2,4,6,8,10,12   CME      
Live Hogs 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 2,4,6,7,8,10,12   CME      
Pork Bellies 01/03/1978 06/02/2008 2,3,5,7,8   CME      
○1 NYMEX-- New York Mercantile Exchange 
○2 CME-- Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
○3 CSCE-- Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange 
○4 CBOT-- Chicago Board of Trade 
○5 KCBT-- Kansas City Board of Trade 
○6 MGEX— Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
○7 ICE—Intercontinental Exchange 
 
 
 
spans from 04/03/1990 to 06/02/2008. Table 1 provides the summary of sample data. I collect 
opening price, and closing price of these commodity futures from Commodity System Inc. Other 
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data, such as government bond index, S&P composite index, and Goldman Sachs Commodities 
Index (GSCI) come from DataStream. I also collect default spread, and term structure of interest 
rates from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website, as well as dividend yield from Shiller 
(2005). 
 
 
4.Methodology 
4.1 Identifying Large One-Day Price Changes 
To infer whether announcements of macroeconomic news or noise trading is more likely 
to explain large price changes, I define the large price changes at the opening as the changes 
from previous day closing price to present day opening price, and the large price changes at the 
closing as the changes from present day opening price to closing price (intraday change). 
Because there is no clear consensus regarding what constitutes a “large” price change,
12 
I 
initially define a positive (negative)shock as a daily returns of 5% or more (-5% or less). Then, I 
verify the robustness of my findings with different definitions: ±10%, ±15%, respectively. 
Further, based on Wong (1997) that utilizes dynamic trigger values based upon expected return 
and volatility, I define a positive (negative) price shock as one where the return on a particular 
day is above (below) two standard deviations the average market daily return computed over [-
60 to -11] days relative to the day of the price shock. To avoid compounding effects, shocks that 
follow within 10 days of a given event day is excluded in the analysis.  
                                                          
12
Shocks are defined in different ways in literature. Howe (1986) defined a shock as a weekly price 
change of 50 percent or more. Atkins and Dyl (1990) select stocks that exhibit the largest one-day price 
changes on 300 trading days. Bremer and Sweeney (1991), Cox and Peterson (1994) define a shock with 
a one-day price decline of 10 percent or more. Mazouz, Alrabadi and Yin (2009) investigate the price 
shocks in excess of 5, 10 and 20 percent. 
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4.2 Identifying Price Patterns  
The essence of the test is to get a feel for potential drivers of large price changes.  To 
determine whether information, maturity effect and seasonal effect are responsible for large 
price changes, a model is specified as follows: 
ititMatitDNOV
itDOCTitDSEPitDAUGitDJULitDJUNitDMAY
itDAPRitDMARitDFEBitDJANitDOPENitY
εαα
αααααα
αααααα
+++
++++++
+++++=
ln14_13
_12_11_10_9_8_7
_6_5_4_3_21
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                       (1) 
where itY  takes the value of 1 if a large price change occurs at day t for commodity futures i, 0 
if no large price change occur at day t for commodity futures i, OPEN_D is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for price changes at the opening, 0 for price changes near the closing. I 
also include 11 dummy variables that proxy for seasonal effects, namely, JAN_D, FEB_D, 
MAR_D, APR_D, MAY_D, JUN_D, JUL_D, AUG_D, SEP_D, OCT_D, and NOV_D. JAN_D takes the 
value of 1 for price changes in January, 0 otherwise. The similar definition is applied to other 10 
monthly dummy variables. December is the base month. The variable Mat is the number of 
days to maturity
13
 . 
The above regression will be performed for each commodity futures contract. If the 
parameter  is positive and statistically significant, then large price changes are more likely to 
occur at the market opening, implying price changes are more likely caused by macroeconomic 
news; hence, less probability of reversal is expected. Large price changes near closing are more 
                                                          
13
 See work of Moosa and Bollen (2001) and Walls (1999). 
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likely caused by trading itself; thus, a larger probability of reversal might be expected, as 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990a) state that noise trader risk keeps 
arbitrageurs from driving prices to fundamental values. Significant parameters  through 13α  
imply that seasonal effect can explain some large price changes.  If the coefficient  14α  is 
negative and significant, Samuelson’s hypothesis holds, implying more occurrences of large 
price changes as the maturity is approached. 
 
4.3 Examination of Effects of Large Price Changes 
To examine whether greater probability of reversal (momentum) follows closing price 
changes than opening price changes, based on the study by Grant, Wolf, and Yu (2005), I first 
define cumulative returns of commodity futures, tCAR , at day t after large price changes as: 
 
          0loglog PPCAR tt −=                                                                                                                     (2) 
 
where    is the futures prices t days after the shock, and 0P  is the futures price at the day of 
shock. 
In turn, the average cumulative returns t days after the shock are calculated as 
 
              ∑
=
=
N
n
tt CARN
ACAR
1
1
                                                                                                                    (3) 
where N is the number of large price changes. 
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Moreover, a price reversal is said to exist if the sign of the average cumulative returns is 
different from the sign of the initial large price changes. Contrary to the definition of reversal, a 
price momentum is defined as the sign of the average cumulative returns is of the same sign of 
large price changes. In addition, a standard t-test is used to test whether tACAR is significantly 
different from zero.  
Then, to investigate the probability of reversal (momentum), I examine cumulative 
results from day 1 through day 10 following large price changes in both opening and closing.
14
  
The probability of reversal (momentum) of tACAR  is defined as the occurrence of significant 
reversal (momentum) of cumulative returns divided by total number of occurrence of large 
price changes near market opening and closing, respectively. 
 
4.4 Tests Incorporating Systematic Risk 
4.4.1    Time-Varying Risks 
The above model does not incorporate changes in systematic risk. To account for the 
abnormal returns and potential effects of time-varying risk on returns of commodity futures, I 
employ a multifactor model, which is based on the study by Miffre and Rallis (2007): 
 
               	
,  
  	,  	,  	&,  	,  	,  	,  
,,                      (4) 
 
                                                          
14
 Cox and Peterson (1994) show significant overreaction for days 1 through 3, consistent with findings 
of Atkins and Dyl (1990) and Bremer and Sweeney (1991). In addition, as time passes, overreaction 
tends to be weaker.  
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where 	, , 	&, , 	, are the returns on the government bond index, the S&P 500 
composite index and GSCI, respectively, and 	, is the risk free rate;  	
, is the logarithm 
returns of commodity futures i at day t. If parameters   , ,  are significant, it suggests that 
returns can be explained by  price movements in the bond market, equity market and 
commodity market. In addition, since abnormal returns would be captured by alpha term and 
changes in beta before and after shock; to test whether parameters   , , and   change 
significantly, I form a model as follows: 
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 	&,  	,  	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,  	,  
,               (5) 
where D is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 for post-shock period, and 0 for pre-shock 
period. The parameter 
 represents price reactions after controlling for systematic risk for 
commodity futures i. A significant change in beta from F-test would suggest abnormal returns. 
 
 
4.4.2    Market Conditions 
The above model does not incorporate changes in economic environments. To account 
for potential effect of market conditions, I divide my sample into two periods: economic 
environments-expansionary and recessionary periods, based on NBER definition,
15
 and examine 
whether returns respond asymmetrically to price movements in the bond market, equity 
market and commodity market in each of these environments. The model is specified as follows: 
  
                                                          
15
 See www.nber.org/cycles. 
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 	&,  	, 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,  	,  
,                (6) 
where D is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 for expansionary periods, and 0 for 
recessionary periods. If parameters   ,  , and   are significantly, it suggests that in 
expansionary environment returns are significantly different from that in the recessionary 
environment.   
 
4.4.3    Business Cycle 
As another extension of Eq. (4), an alternative model incorporates the effects of 
business cycle; the variables to proxy for business cycle include the dividend yield on the S&P 
500 composite index, the term structure of interest rates, and the default spread (Chordia and 
Shivakumar, 2002).  The dividend yield on the market is defined as the total dividend payments 
to the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Value-weighted index over the previous 12 
month divided by the current level of the index. The default spread is defined as the difference 
between the average yield of bonds rated BAA by Moody’s and the average yield of bonds with 
a Moody’s rating of AAA, and is included to capture the effect of default premiums. The term 
structure is measured as the difference between the average yield of Treasury bonds with more 
than 10 years to maturity and the average yield of T-bill that mature in three month; Fama and 
French (1988) show the term structure is closely related to short-term business cycle, and 
default spread tracks long-term business cycle conditions. 
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The model is specified as 
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                                                                                                                                                                                       (7)                                                                                                 
where "
,#$ includes proxies for business cycle such as the dividend yield on the S&P 500 
composite index, the term structure of interest rates and default spread. I use the post-shock 
CARs obtained from Eq. (2) to check whether the returns will change after incorporating 
business cycle. A significant ! would indicate that business cycle can explain some portion of 
cumulative returns of commodity futures. 
 
5.Empirical Evidence 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics about positive and negative price changes in 
both opening and closing. I classify the commodity futures into five categories, namely, energy, 
metal, food (non-grains), grains, and livestock. When a positive (negative) price shock is defined 
as one where return on a particular day is above (below) two standard deviations, the number 
of price shocks usually is smaller than that of a daily return of 5% (-5%) but above 10% (-10%). 
On average, the number of large price changes is larger in the opening than in the closing, 
except for coffee, cocoa, and orange juice that are associated with slightly more large price 
changes near closing. This may suggest that for food (non-grains) contracts, prices are more 
sensitive to trading noise during the trading hours. Most commodity futures exhibit more  
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Table 2  
Summary Statistics of Positive and Negative Shocks in Commodity Futures Markets 
The day of positive (negative) price shock, i.e. the event day 0, is initially defined as one where a daily return is 5% or more (-5% or less). Then I verify the 
results with different definitions: 10% (-10%), 15%(-15%). I also define a positive (negative) price shock as one where the return on a particular day is above 
(below) two standard deviations (2STD) the average market daily return computed over [-60 to -11] days relative to the day of the price shock. To avoid 
compounding effects, shocks that follow within 10 days of a given event day is excluded in this analysis.  
Commodity Futures 
Opening  Closing  
5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15% 2STD -2STD 5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15% 2STD -2STD 
A: Energy                 
Crude oil (CO) 234 180 105 92 65 52 167 121 231 180 132 91 70 51 165 121 
Heating oil (HO) 292 156 142 105 76 57 153 110 190 158 137 121 78 57 154 105 
Natural gasoline (NA) 216 172 108 93 102 75 127 61 215 169 106 94 99 74 99 63 
B: Metals                 
Gold (G) 199 110 84 55 45 23 148 129 127 137 74 50 50 20 117 108 
Copper (C) 321 191 121 35 66 35 174 185 221 189 117 105 68 36 176 182 
Silver (S) 301 250 189 102 96 46 224 164 299 248 183 94 93 46 165 155 
Palladium (P) 270 219 165 120 104 61 184 126 265 217 164 115 103 58 193 163 
Platinum (PL) 298 227 144 98 68 31 232 164 297 220 135 97 66 32 227 172 
Lumber (L) 306 299 181 147 97 60 205 158 303 293 184 142 95 60 129 170 
C: Foods (non-grains)                 
Cocoa (CC) 296 302 186 136 101 46 145 133 302 304 189 136 105 49 214 192 
Coffee (CF) 198 167 83 66 54 34 111 97 200 167 89 76 76 44 121 99 
Cotton (CT) 299 256 145 119 74 47 248 176 300 254 147 120 75 45 251 195 
Orange juice (OJ) 305 327 168 163 91 53 200 224 306 329 173 166 98 55 203 221 
Sugar (SU) 357 356 240 229 163 136 228 195 357 354 247 228 162 136 227 128 
D: Grains                 
Corn (CR) 245 201 175 156 98 47 201 187 221 196 154 132 78 34 187 145 
Kansas city wheat 
(KW) 
222 206 100 51 46 20 187 167 223 203 97 54 45 19 189 146 
Minnesota wheat 
(MW) 
165 136 74 45 38 20 148 139 161 131 76 44 36 18 184 145 
Oats (O) 342 321 191 139 101 51 224 183 334 322 190 136 100 46 220 193 
Wheat (W) 308 287 158 113 81 32 225 195 305 287 162 112 82 32 228 185 
Soybean oil (SO) 315 290 177 130 92 56 221 180 312 292 180 133 96 53 226 184 
Soybean meal (SM) 311 256 160 110 88 50 234 175 311 259 156 111 81 51 237 174 
Soybeans (SOY) 298 239 138 110 76 46 247 176 300 231 135 106 75 42 243 228 
E:Livestock                 
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Table 2 
Continued 
                
    Opening        Closing     
Commodity Futures 5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15% 2STD -2STD 5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15% 2STD -2STD 
Feeder cattle (FC) 207 157 60 47 17 12 205  172 202 161 59 47 17  9 210 185 
Live cattle (LA) 256 216 87 66 26 20 224 190 254 214 89 61 25 19 223 207 
Live hogs (LH) 360 336 234 182 125 86 230 207 358 333 232 182 122 79 235 218 
Pork bellies (PB) 363 366 239 237 161 130 201 218 358 363 240 233 165 127 197 202 
 
 
positive price changes than negative price changes, except that, in the food (non-grains) category and livestock category, cocoa, 
orange juice, and pork bellies have more negative price changes than positive price changes at 5% (-5%) and 2STD (-2STD). This may 
indicate that for these three commodities, there are more announcements of bad news or investors are more risk averse to bad 
news. In addition, feeder cattle and live cattle have the lowest ratio of large  price changes, when large price changes are defined as 
15% (-15%) to large price changes at 5% (-5%), which suggest that prices in these two commodities are relatively stable and investors 
are less liable to respond extremely to news in these two commodities.      
 
5.2 Identifying Price Patterns 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis for factors that might affect large price changes at 5% (-5%). The 
dependent variable equals 1 if there is a large price changes, and independent variables include a set of variables: opening dummy  
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variable, that equals 1 for price changes in the opening, 0 otherwise; and monthly dummy 
variables that proxy seasonality effect on large price changes; as well as the maturity effect, 
which is supposed to be negatively related to large price changes. I classify the commodity 
futures into five. Appendix A presents the similar price patterns for large price changes at 10% 
(-10%), 15% (-15%), and 2STD (-2STD).  
As stated in the introduction, an expected result is that large price changes are more 
likely to occur in the opening because announcements of macroeconomic news are more likely 
to cause large price changes than trading noise. As shown in Table 3, for most commodity 
futures, the coefficient of open dummy variables is positively significant, which implies that 
announcements in the morning are more likely to cause large price changes. The exceptions 
include coffee, cocoa, and orange juice, for which the coefficients are negative, suggesting 
trading noise during the day may better explain large price changes near the closing, which is 
consistent with Table 2 that shows a slightly greater number of large price changes near closing 
than opening for these three food futures. 
Based on the Samuelson’s hypothesis, large price changes are more likely to occur as 
the maturity gets closer. That is, time-to-maturity is expected to be negatively related to large 
price changes, suggesting that the volatility increases as the futures approach to maturity. On 
average, there is a significant negative effect of maturity on large price changes, which suggests 
that when information arrives more frequently near the maturity; investors are more likely to 
respond to such information, inducing a greater likelihood of large price changes. However, 
consistent with results by Duong and Kalev (2006), there is less support for Samuelson 
hypothesis for metal and energy futures, but strong support for food (non-grains), grains, and 
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livestock futures. The findings may suggest that information arrives relatively stable during the 
whole contract period for metal and energy. Based on argument of Bessembinder, Coughenour, 
Seguin, and Smeller (1996), this may also suggest Samuelson hypothesis is more likely to be 
supported in those markets that exhibit a negative covariance between spot price changes and 
changes in net carry costs. 
With regard to seasonal effects, seasonal effect is significant for some commodity 
futures; however, such effects vary across commodities. In the energy category, the coefficients 
for the months July through the turn-of the year tend to be larger and significant. This might be 
explained by greater uncertainty in supply/demand for crude oil, heating oil, and natural 
gasoline during hot weather (July through September) and cold weather (such as January). In 
the food (non-grains) category, the coefficients tend to be larger in the summer months. Since 
the summer months are also the production season of cotton, coffee and cocoa, the greater 
likelihood of supply/demand imbalance in summer might explain more occurrences of large 
price changes in July and August. In grains category, the results indicate that corn has more 
price volatility during the harvest season (September) and wheat has more ‘large’ price changes 
in harvest season (July and August) and planting season (May and June); for all soy products, 
large price changes are more likely to occur in January, the harvest season; for oats, a greater 
number of large price changes occur in September through November; for livestock, more large 
price changes occur in July and August, when there might be greater demand/supply; in the 
metal category, and in precious metal, generally there is much weaker seasonal effects.  
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Table 3  
Price Patterns  
This table reports results for effect of information, maturity effect and seasonal effect on large price changes at 5% (-5%). The dependent variable equals 1 if 
large price changes occur at day t for commodity futures i, 0 if no large price changes occur at day t for commodity futures i, OPEN is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for price changes at the opening, 0 otherwise. I also include 11 dummy variables that proxy seasonal effects, namely, JAN_D, FEB_D, 
MAR_D, APR_D, MAY_D, JUN_D, JUL_D, AUG_D, SEP_D, OCT_D, and NOV_D. JAN_D takes value of 1 for price changes in January, 0 otherwise. The similar 
definition is applied to other 10 monthly dummy variables. The variable Mat is the number of days to maturity. The model is specified as: 
++++++++++= itititit DAUGDJULDJUNDMAYitDAPRitDMARitDFEBitDJANitDOPENitY _____6_5_4_3_21 10987 αααααααααα
itDSEP _11α  itititit MatDNOVDOCT εααα ++++ ln__ 141312 . The asterisks ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Futures intercept open           Jan              Feb            Mar            Apr             May          Jun           Jul                  Aug               Sep              Oct                Nov            Ln Mat 
A:Energy 
CO 0.142 
(***) 
0.042 
(**) 
0.015 
(*) 
0.018 
(**) 
-0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.008 0.016 
(**) 
0.030 
(***) 
0.021 
(***) 
0.025 
(***) 
-0.003 -0.002 
(*) 
HO 0.111 
(***) 
0.043 
(**) 
0.011 
(*) 
 0.005 -0.011 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006  0.004  0.015 
(*) 
 0.016 
(**) 
-0.007 -0.004 -0.001 
NG 0.085 
(***) 
0.067 
(***) 
0.028 
(***) 
 0.009  0.003  0.006  0  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.008   0.008  0.017 
 (**) 
-0.001 
B:Metal 
G 0.032 
(*) 
0.042 
(**) 
 0.003  0.008 -0.010 -0.009 0.013 
(*) 
 -0.007 -0.008 -0.015 
(*) 
 0.000 -0.001    0.000 -0.005 
(*) 
C 0.084 
(***) 
0.053 
(***) 
 0.013  0.001  0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.014 
(*) 
 0.013  0.000  0.008  0.002    0.007 -0.006 
(**) 
S 0.057 
(***) 
0.054 
(***) 
-0.002  0.004 -0.007 -0.008 0.014 
(*) 
 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009    0.003 -0.003 
(*) 
P 0.076 
(***) 
0.056 
(***) 
 0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.005   0.003 -0.008  0.001 -0.002 -0.005    0.001 -0.003 
(*) 
PL 0.027 0.098 
(***) 
 0.000  0.003 -0.002  0 -0.002    0.003  0 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002    0 -0.010 
(**) 
L 0.103 
(***) 
0.034 
(**) 
 0.011 
(*) 
-0.002 -0.006 -0.003  0.000  -0.004 -0.010  0.005  0.013 
(*) 
 0.012 
(*) 
   0.005 -0.008 
(**) 
C: Food (non-Grains) 
CC 0.053 
(***) 
-0.041 
(**) 
 0.005  0.006  0.003  0.006  0.014    0.008  0.011 
(*) 
 0.018 
(**) 
 0.009 -0.001    0.002 -0.015 
(***) 
CF 0.082 
(***) 
-0.046 
(**) 
 0.006  0.006  0.006 -0.000  0    0.008  0.010 
(*) 
 0.030 
(***) 
 0.010 
(*) 
 0.002    0.004 -0.015 
(***) 
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Table 3 
Continued 
             
Futures intercept open           Jan              Feb            Mar            Apr             May          Jun           Jul                  Aug               Sep              Oct                Nov            Ln Mat 
CT 0.076 
(***) 
 0.024 
(*) 
 0 -0.009 -0.000 -0.003  0.002    0.016 
   (**) 
 0.019 
(**) 
 0.011 
(**) 
-0.009 -0.016  -0.003 -0.014 
(***) 
OJ 0.087 
(***) 
-0.026 
(*) 
 0.003  0.006 -0.009 -0.002 -0.004   -0.006  0.001  0.001 -0.005  0.018 
(**) 
  0.022 
(***) 
-0.013 
(***) 
SU 0.042 
(**) 
 0.025 
(*) 
 0.019 
(**) 
 0.006  0.005  0.009  0.009    0.009  0.009  0.005  0.021 
(***) 
 0.005   0 -0.007 
(**) 
D: Grains 
CR 0.106 
(***) 
 0.024 
(*) 
-0.008 -0.004  0  0.002  0.005    0.003  0.005  0.003  0.012 
(*) 
 0.009   0.008 -0.013 
(***) 
KW 0.104 
(***) 
 0.029 
(*) 
 0.006  0.012  0.011  0.001  0.021 
 (***) 
   0.020 
   (**) 
 0.025 
 (***) 
 0.035 
(***) 
 0.001  0.006   0.007 -0.018 
(***) 
M
W 
0.123 
(***) 
 0.051 
 (***) 
 0.003  0.009  0.010  0.002  0.016 
 (**) 
   0.030 
  (***) 
 0.031 
 (***) 
 0.041 
 (***) 
 0.008  0.006   0.002 -0.017 
(***) 
O 0.383 
(***) 
 0.088 
(***) 
-0.009 -0.006  0.006  0.005  0.000    0.005  0.005  0.003  0.064 
 (***) 
 0.035 
 (***) 
  0.031 
  (**) 
-0.005 
(*) 
W 0.056 
(***) 
 0.027 
(*) 
 0.006   0.005  0.004  0.007  0.021 
 (***) 
   0.022 
   (***) 
 0.027 
(***) 
 0.028 
(***) 
 0.006  0.003   0.002 -0.004 
(*) 
SO 0.077 
(***) 
 0.065 
(***) 
 0.014 
(*) 
-0.008  0.003  0.003  0.007    0.009  0.007  0.002  0.002  0.008   0.006 -0.002 
(*) 
SM 0.083 
(***) 
 0.043 
(**) 
 0.022 
(***) 
 0.002 -0.003  0.009 -0.001    0.002  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.007 -0.002 -0.009 
(**) 
SY 0.086 
(***) 
 0.046 
(**) 
 0.013 
(*) 
-0.010 -0.003  0.008 -0.010    0.006  0.009  0.020  0.001  0.010   0.004 -0.007 
(**) 
E:Livestock 
FC  0.026   0.110 
(***) 
  0.009  0.010  0.004  0.006  0.007  0.005  0.017 
(**) 
 0.004  0.004  0.000  0.004 -0.011 
(***) 
LC  0.017   0.057 
(***) 
  0.010  0.008  0.004  0.001  0.006  0.006  0.018 
(**) 
 0.014 
(*) 
 0.010  0.004  0 -0.007 
(**) 
LH  0.063 
(***) 
  0.063 
(***) 
-0.005 -0.010  0.005  0.003  0.000 -0.001  0  0.013 
(*) 
-0.007  0.002  0.001 -0.012 
(***) 
PB  0.036 
(*) 
  0.064 
(***) 
  0.001  0.010  0.002  0.006  0.009  0.005  0.017 
(**) 
 0.016 
(**) 
 0.012 
(*) 
 0.005  0.001 -0.010 
(**) 
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In sum, Table 3 results are generally in line with my expectations: in general, large price 
changes of commodity futures are more likely to be caused by announcements of 
macroeconomic news, and there is evidence supporting the maturity effect and seasonal effect; 
however, the seasonal and maturity effects are less significant in energy and metal futures. 
 
5.3 Effects of Large Price Changes 
To examine whether there is a greater probability of reversal following closing price 
changes than opening prices, I investigate the average cumulative returns after shocks. Figures 
1, 2, 3, and 4 present the average cumulative returns following positive and negative large price 
changes in both opening and closing for all commodity futures at each definition of large price 
changes. Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 present the probability of reversal following large price changes 
in both opening and closing at each definition of large price changes. The summary statistics 
from Figure 1 to Figure 8 are presented in Table 4. 
The table shows that there is a tendency for price reversals following large price 
changes; the reversal occurs from the first day after shock and in general continues as we 
extend our estimation period. This reversal pattern is especially true at 10% (-10%) and 15% (-
15%). At -5%, reversal disappears from second day in the opening and third day in the closing. 
For -2STD level, reversal disappears from third day in the opening and second day in the closing. 
This result supports the overreaction theory that the more extreme initial price movement is, 
the greater the subsequent adjustment. Table 4 also gives the estimates of the probability of 
reversal. Probabilities of reversal might provide a more clear comparison between reversals 
following positive price changes and negative large price changes in both opening and closing. I 
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expect large price changes in closing will induce more reversals than large price changes in 
opening. The rationale for this argument is that large price changes near closing are more likely 
caused by trading noise, and therefore more likely to be followed by reversals. 
On average, there is higher occurrence of reversal following large price change in closing 
than in opening. For example, at 5%, the probability of reversal of ACAR1 is 49.653% following 
large price changes in opening, while the probability is 51.069% following large price changes in 
closing. This suggests that since large price changes near closing are more likely caused by noise 
trading.   
It is plausible that negative price changes will induce more reversals than positive price 
changes. At 5% (-5%), the probability of reversal of ACAR1 is 49.653% following positive price 
change in opening, while 50.311% following negative price changes in opening. This patterns 
holds for other ACARt  at other definitions of large price changes. Therefore, the results support 
asymmetric responses to news. 
There are also some interesting findings regarding reversal of different commodity 
futures. Table 5 presents the results of probability of reversal at the first day following large 
price changes in opening for five futures categories. In general, metal and energy have a lower 
probability of reversal following large price changes. This is especially true for gold, for which 
the probability of reversal is around 11.098% (not shown in the table). Moreover, large 
probability of reversal is found in food (non-grains) and grains. The results suggest that 
participants in the food (non-grains) and grain markets tend to overreact to new information,  
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Figure 1 ACARs Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing at 5% and -5%  
 
 
 
Figure 2 ACARs Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing 10% and -10%  
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Figure 3 ACARs Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing at 15% and -15%  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 ACARs Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing at 2STD and -2STD  
 
 
-0.400%
-0.300%
-0.200%
-0.100%
0.000%
0.100%
0.200%
0.300%
0.400%
0.500%
0.600%
postive opening
positive closing
negative opening
negative closing 
-0.300%
-0.250%
-0.200%
-0.150%
-0.100%
-0.050%
0.000%
0.050%
0.100%
0.150%
postive opening
positive closing
negative opening
negative closing 
63 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Probability of reversal Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing at 5% and -5%  
 
 
 
Figure 6  Probability of reversal Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing at 10% and -10%  
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Figure 7 Probability of reversal Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing at 15% and -15%  
 
 
 
Figure 8 Probability of reversal Following Large Price Changes in Both Opening and Closing at 2STD and -2STD  
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Table 4  
Commodity Price Reaction to Shocks:  Mean-Adjusted ACARs 
The mean adjusted average cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs) are estimated using Eq.(3). ACAR1 are the abnormal returns one day after the shock. ACAR2, 
ACAR3, …, ACAR10 are the average abnormal returns over the [0,2], [0,3],…, [0,10] windows after the shock. The asterisks ***,** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The table presents mean(µ),variability of ACARs(σ), as well as the probability of reversal(P) across all commodity futures.  
 ACAR1 ACAR2 ACAR3 ACAR4 ACAR5 ACAR6 ACAR7 ACAR8 ACAR9 ACAR10 
Panel A: ACARs following positive shocks(5%) in opening price 
µ -0.079%*** -0.078%*** -0.088%*** -0.052%*** -0.063%*** -0.102%*** -0.111%*** -0.103%*** -0.092%*** -0.032%** 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.002% 
P 49.653% 48.740% 48.647% 48.211% 48.243% 48.480% 47.506% 47.609% 47.318% 46.821% 
 
Panel B: ACARs following positive shocks(5%) in closing price 
µ -0.181%*** -0.239%*** -0.038%** -0.030%* -0.026%* -0.001% -0.068%*** -0.036%** -0.050%** -0.143%*** 
σ 0.007% 0.007% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.001% 0.004% 
P 51.069% 49.437% 48.982% 49.051% 48.883% 49.229% 49.201% 49.019% 48.524% 48.306% 
 
Pane C: ACARs following negative shocks(-5%) in opening price 
µ 0.062%*** -0.023%* -0.069%*** -0.310%*** -0.308%*** -0.265%*** -0.063%*** -0.184%*** -0.169%*** -0.190%*** 
σ 0.000% 0.001% 0.002% 0.012% 0.011% 0.011% 0.002% 0.011% 0.011% 0.012% 
P 50.311% 50.254% 49.985% 49.222% 49.523% 49.851% 50.051% 50.089% 49.726% 49.562% 
 
Panel D: ACARs following negative shocks (-5%) in closing price 
µ 0.053%*** 0.036%** -0.019%* -0.012%* -0.060%*** -0.054%*** -0.039%** -0.024%* 0.012%* 0.030%* 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.002% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 51.869% 51.746% 51.614% 51.168% 50.901% 50.570% 51.086% 51.261% 50.263% 50.765% 
 
Panel E: ACARs following positive shocks(10%) in opening price 
µ -0.084%*** -0.076%*** -0.041%** -0.033%** -0.035%** -0.427%*** -0.057%*** 0.017%** 0.001% -0.027%* 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.025% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 50.415% 50.176% 48.466% 47.989% 48.774% 47.843% 47.873% 47.545% 47.712% 48.155% 
 
Panel F: ACARs following positive shocks(10%) in closing price 
µ -0.135%*** -0.163%*** -0.155%*** -0.175%*** -0.152%*** -0.167%*** -0.144%*** -0.191%*** -0.172%*** -0.154%*** 
σ 0.007% 0.007% 0.005% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.008% 0.008% 0.007% 
P 50.738% 48.365% 49.133% 47.670% 48.339% 48.796% 48.774% 49.209% 48.773% 49.473% 
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Table 4 
(Continued) 
 ACAR1 ACAR2 ACAR3 ACAR4 ACAR5 ACAR6 ACAR7 ACAR8 ACAR9 ACAR10 
Panel G: ACARs following negative shocks(-10%) in opening price 
µ 0.109%*** 0.057%*** 0.105%*** 0.144%*** 0.121%*** 0.104%*** 0.165%*** 0.157%*** 0.138%*** 0.207%*** 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 52.233% 53.000% 52.035% 51.014% 50.990% 50.812% 50.992% 50.411% 50.590% 50.624% 
 
Panel H: ACARs following negative shocks(-10%) in closing price 
µ 0.048%** 0.098%*** 0.050%** 0.103%*** 0.109%*** 0.109%*** 0.156%*** 0.129%*** 0.087%*** 0.138%*** 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.001% 
P 53.785% 55.331% 53.585% 52.754% 52.847% 53.015% 52.500% 51.905% 52.916% 52.087% 
 
Panel I: ACARs following positive shocks(15%) in opening price 
µ -0.203%*** -0.271%*** -0.193%*** -0.193%*** -0.131%*** -0.177%*** -0.144%*** -0.158%*** -0.156%*** -0.145%*** 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 49.127% 51.194% 49.101% 48.352% 48.588% 47.912% 47.965% 47.069% 47.204% 47.323% 
 
Panel I: ACARs following positive shocks(15%) in closing price 
µ -0.109%*** -0.193%*** -0.158%*** -0.150%*** -0.129%*** -0.103%*** -0.134%*** -0.141%*** -0.061%*** -0.083%*** 
σ 0.000% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 52.442% 52.705% 50.961% 48.307% 50.282% 49.995% 48.620% 48.744% 50.281% 49.085% 
 
Panel J: ACARs following negative shocks(-15%) in opening price 
µ 0.170%*** 0.136%*** 0.203%*** 0.331%*** 0.173%*** 0.392%*** 0.465%*** 0.387%*** 0.461%*** 0.405%*** 
σ 0.001% 0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.003% 
P 53.441% 52.477% 51.969% 52.821% 54.851% 54.248% 55.027% 55.108% 54.569% 53.070% 
 
Panel K: ACARs following negative shocks(-15%) in closing price 
µ 0.250%*** 0.171%*** 0.260% 0.242%*** 0.161%*** 0.345%*** 0.425%*** 0.485%*** 0.453%*** 0.383%*** 
σ 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.002% 
P 53.418% 54.472% 53.343% 53.698% 52.845% 55.125% 53.992% 53.778% 54.540% 53.510% 
 
Panel L: ACARs following positive shocks(2STD) in opening price 
µ -0.086%*** -0.068%*** -0.030% -0.037%** -0.004% -0.020%* -0.247%*** -0.100%*** -0.077%*** -0.049%** 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.005% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 50.206% 48.620% 47.852% 46.836% 48.004% 47.466% 47.286% 47.145% 46.573% 46.769% 
67 
 
Table 4  
(Continued) 
 ACAR1 ACAR2 ACAR3 ACAR4 ACAR5 ACAR6 ACAR7 ACAR8 ACAR9 ACAR10 
Panel M: ACARs following positive shocks(2STD) in closing price 
µ -0.087%*** -0.060%*** -0.050% -0.017% -0.042%** -0.033%** 0.003% 0.019% 0.001% 0.029% 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
P 52.014% 50.170% 49.401% 47.365% 49.076% 48.362% 48.722% 48.687% 48.258% 48.383% 
 
Panel N: ACARs following negative shocks(-2STD) in opening price 
µ 0.084%*** 0.106%*** -0.103% -0.075%*** -0.029%** -0.041%** -0.015% 0.006% -0.043%** -0.018% 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% 0.002% 0.002% 0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 51.220% 52.444% 50.424% 49.853% 51.067% 50.381% 50.408% 50.247% 50.245% 50.487% 
 
Panel O: ACARs following negative shocks(-2STD) in closing price 
µ 0.061%*** -0.008% -0.092%*** -0.033%*** 0.001% 0.015% 0.019% -0.005% 0.005% -0.038%** 
σ 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
P 52.875% 53.945% 53.647% 51.962% 53.203% 52.662% 52.850% 52.721% 52.043% 52.468% 
 
Table 5 
Probability of Reversal in Five Commodity Categories 
The probability of reversal is defined as the number of reversal divided by the number of large price changes. This table presents the probability of reversal at the 
first day following large price changes in opening for five commodity categories.  
 
Futures 5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15%                 2STD                2STD 
Energy 51.864% 38.930% 52.015% 52.871% 51.152% 43.998% 50.917% 40.608% 
Metal 42.724% 51.064% 43.369% 46.079% 43.698% 42.585% 43.772% 45.640% 
Food(non-grains) 50.603% 51.781% 52.769% 56.042% 58.714% 61.265% 53.994% 54.925% 
Grains 52.337% 54.052% 52.889% 56.526% 54.928% 59.877% 52.983% 55.805% 
Livestock 51.831% 51.553% 52.273% 52.205% 53.714% 56.941% 51.009% 53.985% 
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creating a larger-than-appropriate effect on commodity prices. Similar results are found for 
reversal following large price changes in closing, presented in Appendix B.   
The result for gold is consistent with the following. Based on futures-spot price formula, 
TyvrSeF )( −+= , y is defined as convenience yield. For gold, convenience yield is least variable  
with other commodities (Dincerlaer, Khokher, and Simin, 2005); therefore, it implies lower 
overreaction and less probability of reversal. While for energy, the result is inconsistent with 
my expectation that energy is expected to have a higher reversal. In the energy market, 
commodities are severely affected by the market information, driving price far away from 
fundamentals; thereby, a larger probability of reversal is expected. Therefore, further research 
should focus on the energy market. 
 
5.4. Tests Incorporating Systematic Risk 
The analysis above does not incorporate the effects of common risk factors that might 
affect returns. Table 6 displays various models that adjust for the risk factors. First, to account 
for the potential effect of time-varying risk on returns of commodity futures, I employ a 
multifactor model including returns on GSCI, returns on bond market, and returns on S&P 500. 
Panel A of Table 6 displays the sensitivities of returns to the bond, equity, and commodity 
futures markets. The results indicate that returns of commodity futures are sensitive to the risk 
factors.  The coefficients of α are insignificant, which suggests that the abnormal returns can be 
described as a compensation for exposure to the risks. In addition, in unreported results, F-test 
shows that there is an insignificant change in parameters   , , and   before and after large 
price changes. Since abnormal returns would be captured by both α an changes in β, the results 
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Table 6 Tests Incorporating Systematic Risk 
To account for the abnormal returns and potential effects of time-varying risk on returns of commodity futures, I employ a multifactor model, which is based on 
the study by Miffre and Rallis (2007): titftGSCIgtftPSstftbondbiti RRRRRRR ,,,,,,&,,, )()()( εβββα +−+−+−+=  , where tbondR , , tPSR ,& , and tGSCIR ,  are the 
returns on the government bond index, the S&P 500 composite index and GSCI, respectively, and tfR , is the risk free rate.  tiR , is the logarithm abnormal returns 
of commodity futures i at day t. Panel A presents the results for effect of return on GSCI, equity market, and bond market. In Panel B, I divide my sample into two 
periods: expansionary and recessionary periods, based on NBER definition to account for effect of market condition. Panel C, D, and E presents the effect of 
business cycle, namely, dividend yield on the S&P 500 composite index, term structure of interest rates (the difference between the average yield of treasury 
bonds with more than 10 years to maturity and the average yield of T-bill that mature in one month), and default spread (the difference between the average 
yield of bonds rated BAA by Moody’s and the average yield of bonds with a Moody’s rating of AAA). The model is specified as:
)()()()()()(
,1,,01,,,1,,01,,,1,,01,, tfGSCIgtftbondgtitftbondstftbondstitftbondbtftbondbtiiiti RRRRZRRRRZRRRRZR −+−+−+−+−+−++= −−− ββββββγα           
titiZ ,1, ε+− , where itiZ −,   proxies business cycle. The asterisk *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels.   
 
 5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15% 2STD -2STD 
Panel A: Returns on bond, equity, and commodity markets 
α  -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.001 
bβ  0.011*** 0.002*** -0.001* 0.015*** -0.003* 0.000*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 
sβ  -0.002*** -0.008** 0.029*** -0.042** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.012*** -0.006*** 
gβ  0.012*** -0.004*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.029*** -0.066*** 0.012** 0.006* 
 
Panel B: Market condition  
α     0.000*** -0.003 0.007* -0.002 0.004* -0.007* 0.009* 0.001 
bβ   -0.050*** 0.323** -0.644*** 0.339*** -0.431*** 1.216*** -1.000*** 0.005* 
sβ     0.038** -0.007*** 0.016*** -0.026** -0.065** 0.034* -0.023** -0.029*** 
gβ  -3.179* 0.965* -1.608** 4.453*** 6.551* -4.603*** 3.886*** 3.351*** 
 
Panel C: Default spread  
α  0.000 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.004 -0.007 0.009 0.001 
γ  -0.050*** 0.323*** -0.644*** 0.339** -0.431* 1.216** -1.000* 0.005*** 
0bβ  0.038*** -0.007*** 0.016* -0.026*** -0.065*** 0.034*** -0.023*** -0.029*** 
1bβ  -3.179** 0.965*** -1.608*** 4.453*** 6.551** -4.603** 3.886*** 3.351** 
0sβ  0.072*** -0.127*** 0.243* -0.445* 0.154* -0.237*** 0.124** -0.165*** 
1sβ  -7.232** 12.589*** -20.370*** 44.606*** -11.950*** 33.002** -10.818*** 18.372* 
0gβ  0.049*** -0.004** 0.008** 0.122** 0.086*** -0.029*** 0.021* 0.049*** 
1gβ  -4.762* 0.277*** 0.101*** -9.463* -8.707*** -3.726*** -0.421*** -4.683** 
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Table 6 
(Continued) 
 5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15% 2STD -2STD 
Panel D: Dividend Yield 
α  0.002 0.006 -0.005 0.006 -0.015 0.009 -0.005 0.004 
γ  -0.203** -0.331*** 0.342*** -0.253** 0.900*** -0.255** 0.250*** -0.139*** 
0bβ  -0.012*** 0.002* -0.002* 0.016*** 0.034*** -0.023*** 0.016* 0.015* 
1bβ  1.207*** -0.042*** 0.072*** -0.082*** -1.993*** 1.054* -0.468* -0.852*** 
0sβ  0.075** 0.091** -0.027** 0.042*** -0.388* -0.083*** 0.081*** 0.064** 
1sβ  -4.504* -5.405*** 3.293*** -4.290* 25.252*** 8.980* -3.725** -3.821** 
0gβ  -0.082*** 0.074* -0.104* 0.107*** 0.081* 0.217** -0.151* 0.019*** 
1gβ  5.343*** -4.762** 7.013*** -5.363** -2.916** -16.997*** 9.190** -1.009* 
 
Panel E: Term structure 
α  -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
γ  -0.02*** -0.007** -0.033** -0.101*** -0.153* 0.060*** 0.009 -0.019*** 
0bβ  0.001* 0.003* -0.005*** 0.022** -0.037*** -0.020*** 0.016*** 0.005*** 
1bβ  0.493*** -0.024*** 0.241* -0.407*** 1.841*** 1.127*** -0.524** -0.413** 
0sβ  -0.010** -0.030*** 0.081*** -0.085*** 0.146** 0.049*** 0.058*** -0.049*** 
1sβ  1.000*** 0.806* -2.584*** 2.688* -4.776* 1.079** -2.462* 2.622* 
0gβ  0.004* 0.024*** -0.02*** 0.117*** -0.006*** -0.118*** -0.018*** 0.066*** 
1gβ  0.952** -1.697** 2.137* -3.908** 1.131** 2.513* 1.520*** -3.005* 
 
 
suggest abnormal returns are insignificant. Second, to account for market condition, I use equation (6) that includes a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 for expansionary periods, and 0 for recessionary periods; the results for which are shown in Panel B. The abnormal 
returns after shocks, as represented by α, are significant, which implies that abnormal returns are significant even accounting for 
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market conditions. Moreover, the significant coefficients on   ,  , and   
 suggest that 
abnormal returns are significantly different in expansionary period and recessionary period. 
Panel C presents the result that incorporates the effect of dividend yield on S&P 500. It shows 
that abnormal returns are insignificant and dividend yield has an impact on returns 
ofcommodity futures. Such observation also holds for effect of default spread and term 
structure on return of commodity futures.  
In sum, risks including returns on bond, equity, and commodity futures market, as well 
as the economic environment, and business cycle, can indeed explain returns on commodity 
futures. After accounting for these factors, there is no strong support for overreactions. 
 
6.Conclusion  
My study represents the first attempt to infer the causes and effects of large one-day 
price changes in commodity futures. The results indicate that announcements of 
macroeconomic news in the morning induce a greater number of large price changes. There is 
also evidence for seasonal effects; most commodity futures but metal futures show a significant 
seasonal effect. The maturity effect can explain large price changes mainly in grain, food (non-
grains), and livestock futures. Weak maturity effect can be seen in metal and energy categories. 
To examine the effects of large price change, I focus on the cumulative returns following 
the shock. Consistent with the overreaction theory, reversal occurs from first day after large 
price changes. The results show that more reversals occur in closing than in opening; since price 
changes occur after opening are more likely to be caused by trading noise thus greater chance 
of reversals, this result provides indirect evidence that trading noise is one important driver for 
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price changes. However, further tests incorporating risk factors indicate no strong patterns 
following shocks.  
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Appendix A: 
Price Patterns  
This table reports results for effect of information, maturity effect and seasonal effect on large price changes at 10% (-10%), 15% (-15%), and 2STD (-2STD). The 
dependent variable equals 1 if large price changes occur at day t for commodity futures i, 0 if no large price changes occur at day t for commodity futures i, 
OPEN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for price changes at the opening, 0 otherwise. I also include 11 dummy variables that proxy seasonal effects, 
namely, JAN_D, FEB_D, MAR_D, APR_D, MAY_D, JUN_D, JUL_D, AUG_D, SEP_D, OCT_D, and NOV_D. JAN_D takes value of 1 for price changes in January, 0 
otherwise. The similar definition is applied to other 10 monthly dummy variables. The variable Mat is the number of days to maturity and 
 is an 
independently and identically distributed random disturbance with mean zero and finite variance, i.e.   ～ iid (0,& ). The model is specified as: 
ititititititititititit DSEPDAUGDJULDJUNDMAYDAPRDMARDFEBDJANDOPENY __________ 1110987654321 ααααααααααα ++++++++++=  
itititit MatDNOVDOCT εααα ++++ ln__ 141312  The asterisk *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels.   
 
Futures intercept    open           Jan            Feb             Mar            Apr          May                 Jun            Jul                Aug             Sep                 Oct           Nov               Ln Mat 
Panel A: Price Shock 10%(-10%) 
A: Energy 
CO  0.108 
(***) 
  0.045 
(**) 
  0.015 
(*) 
  0.019 
(**) 
-0.002 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002  0.019 
(**) 
 0.028 
(***) 
 0.027 
(***) 
 0.025 
(***) 
-0.003 -0.002 
(*) 
HO  0.386 
(***) 
  0.042 
(**) 
  0.011 
(*) 
  0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006  0.021 
(***) 
 0.020 
(**) 
 0.003  0.002 -0.002 
(*) 
NG  0.079 
(***) 
  0.022 
(*) 
  0.029 
(***) 
-0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004  0.008  0.009 -0.003  0.011 
(*) 
-0.001 
B: Metal 
G -0.010   0.068 
(***) 
  0.010   0.009  0.001 -0.005  0.023 
(***) 
-0.002  0.002 -0.019 
(**) 
 0.009 -0.000  0.004 -0.006 
(**) 
C  0.041 
(**) 
  0.058 
(***) 
-0.002 -0.003  0 -0.009 -0.005  0.014 
(**) 
 0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005  0.002 -0.007 
(**) 
S  0.013   0.062 
(***) 
  0.003   0.006  0 -0.00  0.014 
(**) 
 0.010  0 -0.006 -0.002  0 -0.001 -0.005 
(**) 
P  0.040 
(**) 
  0.076 
(***) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.006  0 -0.010 -0.009 -0.002  0.001  0.014 
(*) 
 0.001 -0.009 -0.007 
(**) 
PL -0.026   0.103 
(***) 
  0.006  0.001  0 -0.002 -0.001  0.005 -0.004  0 -0.003  0.005  0.001 -0.004 
(*) 
L  0.044 
(**) 
  0.042 
(**) 
  0.011 
(*) 
 0.002 -0.004  0  0.006  0.010  0  0.006  0.014 
(*) 
 0.012 
(*) 
 0.002 -0.009 
(*) 
C: Food (non-grains)        
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Futures intercept    open           Jan            Feb             Mar            Apr          May                 Jun            Jul                Aug             Sep                 Oct           Nov               Ln Mat 
CC -0.018 -0. 105 
(**) 
  0.004  0.006  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.006  0.019 
(**) 
 0.019 
(**) 
 0.008  0  0.008 -0.013 
(***) 
CF  0.024 -0.046 
(**) 
  0  0.011 
(*) 
 0.001 -0.003 -0.011  0.003  0.012 
(*) 
 0.017 
(**) 
 0.029 
(***) 
 0.001  0.002 -0.014 
(***) 
CT  0.030 
(*) 
  0.031 
(*) 
  0 -0.002 -0.001  0  0.002  0.017 
(**) 
 0.013 
(*) 
 0.025 
(***) 
-0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.011 
(***) 
OJ  0.052 
(***) 
-0.083 
(***) 
  0.005  0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002  0.016 
(**) 
 0.011 
(*) 
 0.021 
(***) 
-0.003 
(*) 
SU  0.004   0.063 
(***) 
  0.020 
(**) 
 0.006  0.005  0.001  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.007  0.023 
(***) 
 0.0075 -0.00 -0.010 
(**) 
D:Grains 
CR  0.062 
(***) 
  0.041 
(**) 
  0  0.005  0.001  0.006  0.006  0  0.002   0.004  0.023 
 
 0.001  0.010 -0.013 
(***) 
KW  0.083 
(***) 
  0.033 
(*) 
-0.004 -0.002  0.005  0.009  0.022 
(***) 
 0.028 
(***) 
 0.032 
(***) 
  0.035 
(***) 
 0.007  0.010 -0.002 -0.019 
(***) 
M
W 
 0.040 
(**) 
  0.059 
(***) 
  0 -0.002 -0.004  0.001  0.017 
(**) 
 0.028 
(**) 
 0.029 
 
 0.028 
(***) 
 0.006  0.010 -0.001 -0.018 
(***) 
O  0.260 
(***) 
  0.087 
(***) 
  0 -0.007 -0.003  0.002  0.002  0.008  0.001  0.002  0.049 
(***) 
 0.075 
(***) 
 0.041 
(***) 
-0.004 
(*) 
W  0.045 
(***) 
  0.031 
(*) 
-0.003  0.001  0.010  0.005  0.024 
(***) 
 0.029 
(***) 
 0.029 
(***) 
 0.022 
(***) 
 0.004  0.008  0.002 -0.006 
** 
SO  0.010   0.064 
(***) 
  0.012 
(*) 
-0.003  0.007  0.007  0  0.001  0.003  0.007  0.008  0.002  0.008 -0.004 
(*) 
SM  0.046 
(**) 
  0.041 
(*) 
  0.026 
(***) 
 0.007  0.003  0.004  0.001  0.001  0  0.010  0.010  0.004  0.005 -0.007 
(**) 
SY  0.027   0.072 
(***) 
  0.020 
(**) 
 0.002  0.003  0.002  0  0.010  0.001  0.009  0.010  0.010  0.006 -0.013 
(***) 
E: Livestock 
FC 0.019   0.110 
(***) 
-0.004 -0.001  0.006  0.008  0.001  0.004  0.017 
(**) 
-0.006  0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 
(**) 
LC 0.017   0.041 
(**) 
  0.010  0.011 
(*) 
 0.010  0.010  0.009  0.006  0.017 
(**) 
 0.016 
(**) 
 0.005  0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
(**) 
LH 0.021   0.066 
(***) 
-0.006 -0.007  0.010  0.008  0.007 -0.004  0.004  0.016 
(**) 
-0.001 -0.001  0.003 -0.014 
(***) 
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Futures intercept    open           Jan            Feb             Mar            Apr          May                 Jun            Jul                Aug             Sep                 Oct           Nov               Ln Mat 
PB 0.006   0.112 
(***) 
  0.003  0.001  0.005  0.010 0.010  0.008  0.026 
(***) 
 0.034 
(***) 
 0.028 
(***) 
 0.011 
(*) 
 0 -0.011 
(***) 
 
Panel B: Price Shock 15%(-15%) 
A:Energy 
CO  0.059 
(***) 
 0.047 
(**) 
 0.015 
(*) 
0.021 
(***) 
 0.002   0.001 -0.010 -0.010  0.021 
(***) 
 0.029 
(***) 
 0.027 
(***) 
 0.027 
(***) 
-0.001 -0.004 
(*) 
HO  0.064 
(***) 
 0.087 
(***) 
 0.012 
(*) 
-0.006  0.001 -0.009 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008  0.021 
(***) 
 0.023 
(***) 
 0.015 
(*) 
 0.003 -0.003 
(*) 
NG  0.061 
(***) 
 0.078 
(***) 
 0.030 
(***) 
-0.002 -0.010 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010  0.005  0.002  0  0.025 
(***) 
-0.003 
(*) 
B:Metal 
G -0.018  0.045 
(**) 
 0.007  0.001  0 -0.002  0.021 
(***) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.017 
(**) 
 0.005  0 -0.002 -0.006 
(**) 
C  0.011  0.049 
(**) 
 0.004  0.009  0.010  0.010  0.003 0.015 
(*) 
 0.007  0  0  0.003  0.008 -0.008 
(**) 
S  0.005  0.071 
(***) 
 0  0.001  0 -0.001  0.016 
(**) 
-0.004  0 -0.010  0 -0.001 -0.005 -0.008 
(**) 
P  0.021  0.086 
(***) 
 0.001  0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010  0.013 
(*) 
 0.015 
(*) 
 0.013 
(*) 
-0.007 -0.010 
(**) 
PL -0.019  0.151 
(***) 
 0.009  0.011 
(*) 
 0.001  0  0.005 0.003  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.002 -0.001 -0.007 
(**) 
L  0.019  0.048 
(***) 
 0.012 
(**) 
 0  0  0  0.006 0.009  0.007  0.010  0.013 
(*) 
 0.023 
(***) 
 0 -0.011 
(***) 
C: Food (non-grains) 
CC -0.024 -0.145 
(**) 
 0.001  0.004  0.002  0.009  0.010 0.009  0.019 
(**) 
 0.019 
(**) 
 0  0  0.003 -0.011 
(***) 
CF  0.003 -0.046 
(**) 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 0  0.013 
(*) 
 0.028 
(***) 
 0.030** -0.008 -0.004 -0.017 
(***) 
CT  0.001  0.023 
(*) 
0.003  0.001  0  0  0.004 0.018 
(**) 
 0.015 
(**) 
 0.025 
(***) 
-0.002  0.002  0.001 -0.012 
(***) 
OJ  0.012  0.081 
(***) 
0.010  0.008  0.006  0.008  0.004 0.004  0.002  0 -0.001  0.013 
(*) 
 0.021 
(***) 
-0.011 
(***) 
SU -0.024  0.073 
(*) 
0.021 
(***) 
 0.004  0.002  0.007  0.004 0.009  0.010  0  0.021 
(***) 
 0.006 -0.010 -0.014 
(***) 
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Futures intercept    open           Jan            Feb             Mar            Apr          May                 Jun            Jul                Aug             Sep                 Oct           Nov               Ln Mat 
CR  0.052 
(***) 
 0.078 
(***) 
-0.005  0.002  0.009  0.008  0.005 0.010  0.003 -0.000  0.025 
(***) 
-0.001  0.004 -0.013 
(***) 
KW  0.026  0.046 
(**) 
 0.010  0.011 
(*) 
 0.014  0.002  0.025 
(***) 
0.024 
(***) 
 0.023 
(**) 
 0.035 
(***) 
 0.009  0.010  0.009 -0.019 
(***) 
M
W 
 0.010  0.152 
(***) 
 0.007  0.004  0.009  0.008  0.037 
(***) 
0.056 
(***) 
 0.044 
(***) 
 0.032 
(***) 
 0.009  0.009  0.010 -0.019 
(***) 
O  0.120 
(***) 
 0.132 
(***) 
-0.006  0.011*  0.004  0.006  0.010 0.008  0.008 -0.001  0.050 
(***) 
 0.074 
(***) 
 0.129 
(***) 
-0.026 
(***) 
W  0.026  0.031 
* 
 0.008  0.010  0.010  0.003  0.024 
(***) 
0.035 
(***) 
 0.035 
(**) 
 0.034 
(***) 
0.002  0.010  0.009 -0.011 
(***) 
SO  0.054 
(***) 
 0.067 
(***) 
 0.023 
(***) 
 0.007  0.003  0.002  0.007 0.08  0.009 -0.003 -0.010  0.009  0.009 -0.015 
(***) 
SM  0.049 
(**) 
 0.056 
(***) 
 0.027 
(***) 
 0.003 -0.004  0.002 -0.010 0.009  0.011 
(*) 
-0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.011 
(***) 
SY  0.042 
(**) 
 0.074 
(***) 
 0.025 
(***) 
 0.010  0.010  0.009  0.011 
(*) 
0.004  0.003  0.006 -0.005  0.010  0.005 -0.014 
(***) 
E:Livestock 
FC  0.062 
(***) 
 0.087 
(***) 
 0.002 -0.003 -0.004  0.007 -0.001 0.006  0.023 
(***) 
-0.007  0.003 -0.009  0 -0.015 
(***) 
LC  0.046 
(**) 
 0.072 
(***) 
 0.010  0.004  0.008 0.014 
(*) 
  0.005 0.004  0.023 
(***) 
 0.024 
(***) 
 0.005  0 -0.003 -0.013 
(***) 
LH  0.026  0.072 
(***) 
 0 -0.002  0.007  0.010   0.011 
(*) 
0.009  0.023 
(***) 
 0.009 -0.016 
(**) 
-0.004  0.006 -0.014 
(***) 
PB  0.025  0.167 
(***) 
-0.001  0.002 -0.005  0.009   0 0.008  0.027 
(***) 
 0.040 
(***) 
 0.025 
(***) 
 0.015 
(**) 
-0.005 -0.015 
(***) 
 
 
Panel C: Price Shock 2STD (-2STD) 
A: Energy 
CO  0.080 
(***) 
 0.048 
(**) 
 0.012 
(*) 
 0.017 
(**) 
-0.010 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010  0.016 
(**) 
 0.028 
(***) 
 0.021 
(***) 
 0.028 
(***) 
-0.002 -0.003 
(*) 
HO  0.086 
(***) 
 0.032 
(*) 
 0.011 
(*) 
 0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.010  0.011 
(*) 
-0.006  0.014 
(*) 
 0.016 
(**) 
-0.010  0.001 -0.009 
(**) 
NG  0.072 
(***) 
 0.067 
(***) 
 0.029 
(***) 
-0.002 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009  0.007 -0.002 -0.011  0.015 
(*) 
-0.004 
(*) 
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Futures intercept    open           Jan            Feb             Mar            Apr          May                 Jun            Jul                Aug             Sep                 Oct           Nov               Ln Mat 
G  0.056 
(***) 
 0.043 
(**) 
 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006  0.018 
(**) 
 0 -0.005 -0.016 
(**) 
 0.006 -0.008  0.005 -0.006 
(**) 
C  0.048 
(**) 
 0.061 
(***) 
 0.010  0  0.004 -0.006  0.005  0.011 
(*) 
-0.001 -0.006 -0.005  0.007  0.003 -0.006 
(**) 
S  0.048 
(**) 
 0.072 
(***) 
 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.013 
(*) 
-0.010 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 
(*) 
P  0.043 
(**) 
 0.052 
(***) 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 
(**) 
PL  0.040 
(**) 
 0.092 
(***) 
 0.010  0.006  0  0.006  0  0.003  0.001 -0.001 -0.004  0.032  0 -0.005 
(*) 
L -0.024  0.046 
(**) 
-0.011 
(*) 
-0.001 -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 -0.010 -0.010  0  0.010 
(*) 
 0.013*  0.015* -0.015 
(***) 
C: Food (non-grains) 
CC  0.011 -0.056 
(***) 
 0.006  0.007  0.010  0.009  0.010  0.002  0.016 
(**) 
 0.015 
(*) 
-0.001 -0.003  0.0081 -0.017 
(***) 
CF  0.023 -0.057 
(***) 
 0.004  0  0.001 -0.008 -0.002  0.011  0.015 
(*) 
 0.03 
(***) 
 0.015 
(*) 
-0.010  0.006 -0.014 
(***) 
CT  0.030 
(*) 
 0.020 
(*) 
-0.001 -0.009  0.002 -0.006  0.001  0.017 
(**) 
 0.018 
(**) 
 0.018 
(**) 
-0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.015 
(***) 
OJ  0.043 
(**) 
-0.026 
(*) 
 0.010  0.002 -0.008 -0.002  0.004  0.010  0.010  0.006 -0.001  0.021 
(***) 
 0.015 
(*) 
-0.011 
(***) 
SU  0.044 
(**) 
 0.020 
(*) 
 0.021 
(***) 
-0.001 -0.009  0.003 -0.005  0.003 -0.001 -0.011  0.018 
(**) 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.011 
(***) 
 
D:Grains 
CR  0.026  0.043 
(**) 
 0  0.002 -0.001  0.002  0.002  0.010  0.005  0.010  0.019 
(**) 
 0  0 -0.015 
(***) 
KW  0.064 
(***) 
 0.024 
(*) 
-0.002  0.002 -0.004  0.004  0.018 
(**) 
 0.025 
(***) 
 0.023 
(***) 
 0.017 
(**) 
 0.001  0 -0.005 -0.016 
(***) 
M
W 
 0.079 
(***) 
 0.059 
(***) 
 0 -0.001 -0.007  0  0.024 
(***) 
 0.031 
(***) 
 0.034 
(***) 
 0.018 
(**) 
 0.002  0 -0.007 -0.020 
(***) 
O  0.131 
(***) 
 0.059 
(***) 
-0.004  0.011 
(*) 
-0.003  0.003  0.005  0.008  0.01  0.003  0.048 
(***) 
 0.049 
(***) 
 0.032 
(**) 
-0.017 
(***) 
W  0.033 
(*) 
 0.024 
(*) 
-0.002  0.001  0  0.001  0.015 
(**) 
 0.023 
(***) 
 0.011 
(*) 
 0.019 
(**) 
 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.016 
(**) 
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Futures intercept    open           Jan            Feb             Mar            Apr          May                 Jun            Jul                Aug             Sep                 Oct           Nov               Ln Mat 
SO -0.012  0.056 
(***) 
 0.012 
(*) 
 0.002  0.001 -0.001 -0.003  0.001  0.002  0.009 -0.0018 -0.002 -0.001 -0.017 
(***) 
SM  0.010  0.043 
(**) 
 0.019 
(**) 
-0.002  0.002 -0.001  0  0.004  0.010  0.008  0.003  0  0.002 -0.011 
(***) 
SY  0.011  0.045 
(**) 
 0.017 
(**) 
 0.004  0.008  0.004  0.004  0.009  0.002  0.010  0.006  0.004  0.002 -0.012 
(***) 
E:Livestock 
FC -0.005  0.134 
(*) 
-0.002 -0.001  0.003  0  0.003  0.003  0.023 
(***) 
-0.002  0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 
(**) 
LC -0.010  0.045 
(**) 
 0.004  0  0.006  0.009  0.004  0.002  0.024 
(***) 
 0.013 
(*) 
 0.002  0.003  0 -0.008 
(**) 
LH  0.006  0.056 
(***) 
-0.002 -0.007  0.010  0.001  0.007 -0.004  0.010  0.019 
(**) 
 0  0.001 -0.007 -0.012 
(***) 
PB -0.011  0.054 
(***) 
 0.004  0.001  0.005  0.010  0.008  0.009  0.013 
(*) 
 0.017 
(**) 
 0.011 
(*) 
 0.013 
(*) 
-0.001 -0.017 
(***) 
 
 
Appendix B: 
Probability of Reversal of Five Categories 
The probability of reversal is defined as the number of reversal divided by the number of large price changes. This table presents the probability of reversal at the 
first day following large price changes in closing for five commodity categories.  
Futures 5% -5% 10% -10% 15% -15%                      2STD                   -2STD 
Energy 51.019% 50.523% 49.176% 50.225% 50.611% 53.291% 50.414% 48.846% 
Metal 45.803% 50.904% 49.962% 54.036% 43.650% 47.754% 49.555% 53.563% 
Food (non-grains) 52.791% 52.302% 53.354% 54.428% 52.613% 58.077% 54.067% 57.180% 
Grains 54.045% 52.723% 51.442% 56.146% 51.329% 54.197% 54.337% 51.424% 
Livestock 52.593% 52.215% 49.388% 54.106% 48.373% 55.913% 53.769% 52.384% 
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